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Certainly, a decision to (dis) invest (buy/sell) in securities is largely influenced by future 
expectations to which in turn is informed by the fundamental analysis of historical prices. The 
investor supposedly extrapolated on the historical prices if below the mean you buy and vice 
versa. The average security prices must be the product of the passing of time but most 
importantly the direction must be susceptible to a particular point in time.  Investor decision-
making involves a selection of a combination of the individual security characteristic with the 
market sentiment (bearish or bullish). The market sentiments are measured on time passed, 
ie market prices are either higher or lower relative to historical prices and the investor holding 
period wish. Valuation is nothing but a timing exercise to which the future perspective is forged 
on the future outlook of both micro and macro-economic factors.  The valuation is relative to 
a true return generating process for a ‘true’ single security market portfolio, ie expected future 
earnings. The occurrence of ‘unexpected earnings’ creates an expectation of above ‘true’ 
market portfolio returns, ie abnormal returns (ARs). This study is premised on the appreciation 
and understanding of the manifestation of a ‘true’ single stock market portfolio. 
The study presents the analysis of the contemporaneous association of unexpected earnings 
also referred to as cautionary earning or ‘earnings surprise’ published in the Trading Statement 
releases (hereinafter referred to as ‘releases’) and security price movement. This research 
study is the second to investigate, at least to the researcher’s knowledge after Cata (2015), 
the entire price formation process on the effects of unexpected cautionary and annual earnings 
announcements on security market prices of the JSE listed. Firstly, the expectations are that 
security prices adjust immediately to earnings and /or price-sensitive market information when 
made public. Secondly, since earnings information is fully impounded onto security prices a 
not statistically significant ARs are earned on and around the disclosures. Lastly, no 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns (ie CARs) post-earnings releases and 
announcements (ie PEADs) and any non-random security return drift indicate a level of 
inefficiency.  
The study adopted a return based unexpected earnings measures or model of Foster, Olsen 
and Shevlin (1984), and Van Rensburg’s (2002) two-factor Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) to 
be a factor analytic procedure for assessment of a true return generating process for a ‘true’ 






The empirical evidence suggests investors revise the security valuations to an extent of 85 to 
90 (Ball and Brown, 1968) and 85 to 98 (Kornik, 2005) percentage before an unexpected 
earnings announcement. This observation strengthens the argument that other timelier 
sources of information are already factored into share price prior to unexpected earnings 
releases.  
An alternative argument on legitimate information dissemination and other timelier sources of 
information provides a compelling argument for an all-encompassing multi factor-model in the 
context of JSE. According to Dr. Holman (20181) a measured or weighed multi factor-model 
consisting of a metal index, interest rate (ie 5 or 10 years repo rate), inflation rate, currency, 
beta, economy (ie GDP growth), stock size (small vs large capitalisation), leverage, 
unemployment rate, values such as price to book value or price-earnings (P/E) ratios, 
momentum (market biases – a big thing). Perhaps this to provide an explanatory power or 
rationale of the full market reaction when all price-sensitive factors are considered at once and 
rated accordingly is to explain the extent of the usefulness of the market information from a 
piece of specific unexpected event news. In so doing provide for an opportunity to improve on 
the true return generating process for a ‘true’ single stock market portfolio from Van 
Rensburg’s (2002) two-factor Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). 
The study’s results come from an observation of five unexpected earnings models or 
measures and the trading statement news sign and size to ascertain the size of the security 
price movement and return drift. The evidence gathered is conclusive concerning the 
association of the information content generated through unexpected earnings disclosures 
and the average CARs and their t-statistic test found to be significantly different from the 
theoretical or expected zero return. However, the outcome of t-statistic tests is not statistically 
significant at a 5% significance level of significance over the observation period, therefore, 
they cast doubt on the use of the initial response to consistently earn earnings above average 
normal returns.  
 
The study observed a security price movement in line with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios on 
[-3; -1] and [-1; -1] releases and [-2; -1] announcements in support of Kornik’s (2005) 
observation of a significant portion of the market reaction occurring in the two days prior to the 
announcement date. Kornik (2005) suggests that either a substantial information leakage or 
simply legitimate information dissemination and /or anticipation (ie from other timelier sources 
of information) allows for investors to correctly adjust their earnings prediction through 
 
1 From the lecture notes 
5 
company analysis and /or interviews with management prior to unexpected earnings 
announcements.  
This study conclusion is that there is evidence of significant association to suggests an 
investor reassessment of their beliefs/expectations on the occurrence and the size of ‘earnings 
surprise’ and unexpected annual earnings. The finding violates the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH) which assumes that security prices are instantly and fully reflective of all 
available information and that investors cannot use public information to consistently gain 
above-normal returns (Cata, 2014). 
It important to highlight that, contrary to Murie’s (2014) and Cata’s (2015), the study found no 
suggestion that investors wait to determine the uncertainty regarding the specific reason for 
the change in earnings on the releases date to be alleviated via the announcement or 
publication of actual earnings to conclude on inconsistencies observed with semi-strong form 
market efficiency. First and foremost a conclusion must be reached based on significant 
abnormal returns earned on the market news in periods surrounding earnings releases and 
announcements strengthened by the outcome of the unexpected earnings measures or 
models. Secondly, Murie (2014) correctly pointed out that unexpected earnings models or 
measures are not an information source to the market, unlike trading statement releases or 
earnings announcements. Thirdly, Murie (2014) did not investigate the entire price formation 
process and his [+3;+60] post-release would have included the effects of earnings 
announcements considering that on average it trails by approximately 9 trading days from the 
releases. What is known based on this study observation and Kornik’s (2005) assertion is that 
new information should be impounded into the security price within a week (ie 5 days on 
average) of the announcement. 
The significant price movements appear to be taking place on intraday releases, previous 
studies show that the focus was only on closing and opening security prices. The observed 
price movement prior to, on the event date and after the release date supports the findings of 
Ball and Brown (1968) that the market uses other timelier sources of information available in 
the market to revise share valuations (Murie, 2014). However, the unexpected earnings are 
partly timely to the extent of approximately 15 to 10 (Ball and Brown, 1968) and /or 15 to 2 
percent (Kornik, 2005)  resulting from investors’ revision of the security valuations to between 
85 to 90 percent (Ball and Brown, 1968) and 85 to 98 (Kornik, 2005) percent before an 
unexpected earnings announcement. The researcher’s view is that, since the expectations, in 
most cases, are influenced by the analysis of previous earnings announcements, the actual 




evolution of the investor/market sentiment and overtime change in earnings is judged in this 
context (i.e reaction). 
At this point, it is advisable that future research looks into or considers subdividing the releases 
into voluntary (ie management forecast) and compulsory release (i.e regulatory requirement 
since 2010) as the latter appears to influence the extent of investors’ response.  
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1.1 BACKGROUND  
 
The primary focus of this study is on the analysis and assessment of the market reaction to 
and the duration of the effect of the firms’ unexpected earnings on security price of FTSE/JSE 
Top 40 constituents of the South African (SA) Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).   
The listed security return is measured by the movement in market security prices covering 
periods from January 2014 to March 2019. For this study, the JSE Financial-Industrial and 
Resource indices are used as observable market proxies, identified by the JSE codes 
FIND30TR and RESI20TR, to measure the market return. The study employes a two-factor 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) as the true return generating process for a ‘true’ single stock 
market portfolio. The study has adopted a return-based unexpected earnings measures or 
model of Foster et al. (1984) and Van Rensburg’s (2002) two-factor Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(APT) factor analytic procedure as the true return generating process for a ‘true’ single stock 
market portfolio.  
There is a strong argument that favors consideration of several ‘priced’ factors that cause or 
create the movement of the market share prices (Dr. Holman, 2018). The multiple-factor risk 
model consists of industry factors and risk indices. The ‘priced’ factors must be reduced to 
priority factors consisting of at least three categories, namely: responses to external 
influences, cross-sectional comparisons of asset attributes and purely internal or statistical 
(Dr. Holman, 2018). The trading statement releases contain most of these factors broadly 
classified as micro and macro-economic factors. 
The selection process of the research paradigm (such as established measures of models), 
methodology, hypotheses, and data are discussed in detail below in chapters 3, 4 and 5, 
respectively. It is important to note that this study does not purport to investigate the form of 
JSE efficient market hypothesis (EMH), however, the analysis is instrumental in forming an 
opinion or viewpoint to determine whether JSE is indeed a weak or semi-strong form of market 
efficiency. 
The problem question is whether or not the unexpected earnings generate new and sufficiently 
material information for the market to cause investor reaction in seeking to integrate this 




competitive behaviour of market participants to cause security price or asset valuation to 
consistently and continuously adjust to reflect all new price-influential information. 
Beaver, et al. (2005), provides an example of legal disputes relating to financial statement 
reporting, how much of the stock price would have been affected had the company released 
its ‘correct’ earnings in place of allegedly inflated earnings. The compulsory releases are 
regulatory mechanisms in monitoring the market activities within JSE to minimize the 
possibility of abnormal profitable arbitrage opportunities within the stock market (Phiri, 2015).  
 
Cornell and Landsman (1989) argue that the unexpected increases in earnings are associated 
with a rise in stock prices, while the unexpected decreases in earnings are associated with a 
fall in stock price. The unexpected earnings are classified into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios 
according to the sign of trading statement releases. To the extent that the unexpected earnings 
announcement is unanticipated and the content therein could not have imagined or was 
unforeseeable by the market participants, as such, they are likely to provide new information. 
In the context of other timelier sources of information, Imhoff and Lobo (1984), stated that 
analyst forecasts complement the management forecasts in those periods when management 
publicly releases forecasts and acts as substitutes in periods when management does not 
issue public forecasts. According to Kornik (2005), analyst forecasts are a more accurate 
measure of expected earnings than prior-year earnings. 
 
1.2 APPROACH TO THE STUDY: EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY  
 
The security return is examined in four distinct periods modified from Das, Kim and Patro 
(2007) and Cata (2014) observation period, namely: 
(i) At the trading statement release date;  
(ii) At the period subsequent to the trading statement releases and preceding the 
actual earnings announcement;  
(iii) At the time of the actual earnings announcement; and 








The proposed research study is to examine the following key elements in the price formation 
process; 
▪ effect of voluntary and/ or compulsory management profit forecasts disclosure’s on the 
issuer’s referenced listed security price. 
▪ effect of management profit forecast disclosures on the direction of good’ or ‘bad’ news 
portfolios and size of the security price movement of the issuer’s referenced listed 
security price. 
▪ duration of effects and direction of the security price movement of the issuer’s 
referenced listed security price post unexpected earnings disclosures. 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT/PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 1.3.1 Purpose of the study 
 
This study aims to investigate the entire price formation process resulting from the effects of 
unexpected cautionary and annual earnings announcements on the security market prices of 
the JSE listed companies. 
An important attribute of JSE semi-strong form market efficiency is that the effects of publicly 
available information are fully reflected on security prices. The security prices adjust 
immediately to reflect the anticipated events newly generated information making it almost 
impossible to earn above-normal returns and to forecast future price variations 
The main purpose of the study is the analysis and assessment of the anticipated market 
reaction and observe the duration of the effect of the firms’ cautionary and annual earnings 
announcement on the JSE top40 issuer’s listed securities price. 
 
1.3.2 Research questions 
 
Primary research questions are as follows: 
▪ Is there any association between the unexpected earnings or 'earnings surprises' 
conveyed through trading statement releases and earnings announcement on the 





Secondary research questions and /or problems are as follows: 
▪ Is there any association between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios based on the 
sign of the trading statement release and the security price direction or movement prior 
to, on, and after the release and announcement date? 
▪ Is the duration of the effects of the anticipated events and the subsequent newly 
generated information on the security price movement lead to an investor's potential 
earnings of above-normal returns? 
 
1.4 THE RESEARCH SCOPE OF STUDY  
 
The study’s research scope is limited to the observation of the future return generating 
processes on and around five to plus five days period surrounding the unexpected earnings 
or 'earnings surprises' releases and annual earnings announcement. The collected data from 
the SENS database on IRESS (ie McGregor BFA) are in respect to trading statement releases, 
earnings announcements and security prices from the period of January 2014 to March 2019. 
The scope of the study to include: 
▪ Chapter 1: provides a  background to the study research 
▪ Chapter 2: provides for the theoretical framework that supports the theory of the 
research study through conducting the prior empirical literature reviews on Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH), Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT-model) and Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). 
▪ Chapter 3: conducts an empirical literature review on the informational content of 
accounting income numbers, security return and anticipated events of more other 
timely sources of information. 
▪ Chapter 4: outlines the research paradigm, methodology, hypotheses, data and study 
event approach. 
▪ Chapter 5: outlines the selection criteria for the firm’s inclusion into the sample, data 
sources, collection information collection process and limitation. 
▪ Chapter 6: analysis the empirical results and discuss the research findings. 





1.5 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
 
The main motivator for this research is to contribute and to strengthen the recent related 
literature to see if this study will come to a similar conclusion, albeit using, a variety of research 
methodology. The market sentiments and business confidence has changed in recent times 
marked by state capture-related allegations, corruption both in private and public sectors, 
Nene-gate saga and external pressures from rating agencies to global uncertainties.   
The desired outcome could be robust as the researcher in this study covers a complete 
separate period compared to that of Murie (2014) and Cata (2015), the researcher also 
addresses some of the shortcomings from sample size to testing for the violation of semi-
strong form market efficiency. 
As indicated in the previous section, it appears as if this  is the second study to be investigated, 
at least to the researcher’s knowledge, after Cata (2015), the entire price formation process 
on the effects of unexpected cautionary and annual earnings announcements on security 
market prices of the JSE listed 
The key shortcoming of these event studies’ are, including but not limited to, the curious 
observation of the tendency to treat market events in isolation from each other when assessing 
their effects on the security price. Meaning the treatment of the market events is separated as 
if far apart from each other. A consented effort to investigate any price movement prior to the 









2.1 EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
2.1.1 Background 
 
This chapter provides for the theoretical framework that supports the theory of the research 
study through conducting the prior empirical literature reviews on Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT-model) and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
An efficient market must then mean market participants or rather the participation of a 
substantial number of investors or traders, i.e market reaction – a rational and competitive 
behavior, a substantial and collective move based on the sign and size of news in their 
endeavour of profit-seeking upon participants accessing and consuming the newly available 
information or unexpected event news. The rationale shows that there is a consensus on the 
nature of information (ie new and unexpected) and competitiveness (ie promptly, therefore, 
opportunistically) to mean it is seen as an opportunity to profit.  
 
The security price adjusts quickly to represent the current (no future misalignment of 
expectations) market consensus or expectations (ie timely reaction to what is known now or 
expectations of what is known now to continue in a certain direction). Present security prices 
represent the market's expectation of future cash flows and growth (Swart & Hoffman, 2013) 
and it must be based on what is known now informing rational expectations of future security 
return. If not based on that then the market is speculative on future cash flows and growth. 
 
An anomaly (i.e inconsistency to what is rational or accepted or expected) refer to the market's 
or investors’ inefficient response – insignificant reaction to unexpected event news such as 
new information but occurs only if on average investors are rational and competitive (i.e 
consistent in observing and acting on market opportunities such that the ultimate goal of profit-
seeking is achieved). 
The essence of what becomes of this study depends on what transpires following the notion 
of rationale and competitiveness of the market (i.e efficient markets assumption) and the 
existence of arbitrage opportunities upon efficient disclosure of unexpected event news. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) presupposition is that the security price materially 
reflects the newly available information (Fama, 1991) from a variety of [timely] forces 




of [timely] forces impound available information into security prices fast enough that arbitrage 
opportunities cannot be exploited systematically (Langevoort, 1992).  
According to Beaver (1972) the capital market efficiency and the content of information 
contained in the accounting data can be inferred by observing security prices and volume 
reaction to announcements of these data. An economist, Michael Jensen (1978), argues that 
EMH is the most empirically sound economic proposition. However, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) 
hold a different view, they are of the belief that prices do not follow a random walk and witness 
a general reluctance to reject the notion of market efficiency. 
In an efficient market, costless or less costly information is not only a sufficient but necessary 
condition for prices to fully reflect all available information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980 and 
Fama, 1970). However, Hayek (1945) believes this is irrational in the sense that price systems 
and competitive markets are important only when information based on is costly. In addition, 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that cost less or less costly information must be precisely 
consumed by informed traders to form an equilibrium. Only then the security price fully reflects 
the market sentiment at a particular point in time of a rational and competitive investor. 
To summarise the EMH, a weak form is when historic information is fully reflected in security 
prices. The semi-strong form is when the security prices efficiently (ie speed and accuracy) 
adjust to reflect publicly available information. The strong form is when security prices fully 
reflect all available information (ie public and private) relevant for price formation in which no 
monopolistic access (ie efficient disclosures) by concerned individuals and/ or institutional 
investors (Fama, 1970). 
Similar to Murie’s (2014) and Cata’s (2015) empirical research attempts to validate the semi-
strong form of the EMH which is ongoing. This research attempts to contribute to this ongoing 
effort of investigations and tests on how quickly and accurately the unexpected event news 
and publicly available information is incorporated into security prices. 
Furthermore, Kruger (2011), states that the EMH is closely related to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1976). 
Therefore, this study considers both APT-model and CAPM and employs broad market indices 








2.1.2 Challenges to efficient market theory  
 
The main challenge to inferences about market efficiency is the joint-hypothesis problem and 
is more serious (Fama, 1991). He further claimed that the market efficiency per se is not 
testable unless tested jointly with some model of equilibrium, for example, an asset pricing 
model. According to Fama 1970 to test whether the information is properly reflected in prices, 
it must be done in the context of a pricing model that defines the meaning of ‘properly’.  
There are various benchmark return models available for consideration in the determination 
of the abnormal return (ie unexpected returns) such as the capital asset price model and 
arbitrage price theory model to determine an expected return. In the next sections (2.2 and 
2.3), the study discusses the CAPM together with the APT-model in the calculation of 
‘expected return’ herein referred to as ‘benchmark return’. 
The rationality of the investors is very critical to the efficient market theory. The assumptions 
underlying the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) are that of the availability of information and 
the rationality of the market, i.e. prices respond immediately to new information (Murie, 2014). 
Shleifer (2000) elaborates further, that the basic theoretical case of EMH is informed by three 
arguments that rely on progressively weaker assumptions. Namely, (1) investors are assumed 
to be rational, (2) to the extent that some investors are irrational, their random trades cancel 
each other out without affecting prices. And, (3) the irrational investors are met by market 
rational arbitrageurs canceling out their influence of prices. 
The EMH does not live and die by investor rationality, adds Shleifer (2000). He argues, if 
irrational investors are in large numbers and their trading strategies are uncorrelated, trades 
cancel each other out. He concludes that when investors are not fully rational, not trading in 
large numbers and their strategies are uncorrelated, the market is still predicted rational 
(Shleifer, 2000). 
 
2.1.3  Test of semi-strong efficiency  
 
The test for market efficiency consists of any observable patterns in security returns (ie 
technical analysis) and market responses to new and therefore current (ie speed and 
accuracy) information (fundamental analysis).  In addition, any observable investors’ reaction 
two days prior to the unexpected event could suggest an information leakage of material and 




The test for focuses on the direction and size of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios in and around 
unexpected event news of [-2; +2], [-2; +0], [-2; +1], [+0; +1], [+0; +2] unexpected earnings 
model or measures and /or days variation and a drift of  [1; +2] and  [3; +5] window period. 
The test measures the immediate effects of published information reflected in the releases 
and earnings announcement on the security prices. The test conducted to provide evidence 
of the direction and size of CARs, return drift and whether it significantly different from zero or 
approximately equal to zero during the window period (ie 𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅 = 0 or AR ≠ 0). In a semi-
strong form of the efficient market, the security prices adjust instantaneously to new 
information rendering post news drift non-existent, ie 𝐻0 : 𝐴𝑅 = 0 (Murie, 2014). 
Titan (2015) asserts a similar view, that in the case of the semi-strong form of EMH present 
on capital market neither technical nor fundamental analysis can determine how an investor 
would split his/her funds to obtain profitability that is higher than what would be achieved in 
case of investment in a random portfolio of financial assets. 
If no significant price movement is observed, it will confirm that the current security prices 
materially reflect the newly available information (Fama, 1991) from a variety of forces 
(Langevoort, 1992).  
 
2.2 ASSET PRICING MODEL 
2.2.1 Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
 
Although trading traditional models of investments provides some insight, however, the 
shortcomings are largely based on the conditions of certainty. The pervasive influence of risk 
led to the adoption of models of price behaviour that are more than just assertions, 
acknowledged by Sharpe (1964). This led to developing a model to predict the behaviour of 
capital markets to address the observed shortcomings of traditional models that contributed 
to mispricing through the introduction of positive microeconomic theories that deal with 
conditions of risk. 
In testing for market rationality and to determine the capital asset prices, Sharpe (1964), began 
with a description of the process through which individual preferences and physical 
relationships interact to determine an equilibrium pure interest rate. Hereafter, a market capital 
line (also referred to as an efficient frontier of securities) asserts that if the investor follows 
rational procedures (ie primarily diversification) the desired point is attained along the capital 




In essence, the CAPM presents you two components of risk inherent in an asset (ie 
unsystematic or specific risk) that can be avoided and the systematic or non-specific risk that 
is common amongst all assets in the market (Sharpe, 1964).  Sharpe’s (1964) CAPM is a 
combination of Markowitz’s (1952) effects and limits of diversification and Tobin’s (1958) risk-
free asset in the portfolio allocation. The risk of a single asset relative to the market portfolio 
(ie systematic risk) is measured by Beta. Expected returns according to CAPM:  
[𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 +  𝐵𝑖 [𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓] 
Where: 
𝐵𝑖  =  
𝑖 𝑟𝑖𝑚
 𝑚





▪ (𝑅𝑖) is the expected return on asset.  
▪ 𝑅𝑓  is the return on the risk-free asset. 
▪ [(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓] is market risk premium. 
▪ 𝐵𝑖 is the security’s non-diversifiable risk. 
The above equation represents the security market line, therefore, holds the security or 
portfolio’s expected return. Kruger (2011) pointed to several restrictive assumptions, firstly, 
simplified assumptions that don’t normally hold in practice, secondly, it implies the existence 
of the measurable market portfolio comprising of all assets traded in the market.  He further 
argues that although such portfolios might exist it is not practically possible to either identify 
or measure its composition, therefore, proponents of the CAPM are forced to employ proxies. 
To conclude, in addition to mentioned restrictive assumptions, there are problems associated 
with CAPM such as being a one-factor model (ie beta), the correlation between two securities 
is closely related to the volatility or standard deviation and beta regardless of whether it is a 
financial, mining, or any other security types.  
 
2.2.2 The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing (APT-model)  
 
Ross (1976) developed the APT model as an alternative to mean-variance CAPM introduced 
by Sharpe (1964) for explaining the phenomena observed in capital markets of risky assets. 
The mean-variance model (ie 𝐸𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖) relationship of any asset, 𝑖, it’s the expected or 




𝐸𝑖 = p + λ𝑏𝑖 
Where: 
- p is the riskless rate of interest. 
- λ = (𝐸𝑚 – p) is the expected excess return on the market. 
𝐵𝑖  =  
𝑖 𝑟𝑖𝑚
 𝑚





- 𝛽 is the beta coefficient on the market. 
- 𝑚
2  the variance of the market portfolio. 
- 𝑖 𝑟𝑖𝑚 is the covariance between the returns on the 𝑖th asset and the market portfolio.  
According to Ross (1976) the restrictiveness of the assumptions that underlie the mean-
variance model (ie 𝐸𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖) led to an alternative theory of pricing of risky assets developed 
that retains many of the intuitive results. Roll and Ross (1980) stated the APT-model that 
demonstrates the market equilibrium is consistent with no-arbitrage profit. Therefore, the 
CAPM is derived from a market equilibrium argument, whereas, APT-model is derived from 
an arbitrage argument (Van Der Merwe, 2016).  
Kruger’s (2011) view under the APT-model is that the correction of mispricing requires a small 
number of investors to restore equilibrium prices. Consistent with no-arbitrage profit (Roll and 
Ross, 1980) investors will react immediately to any possible arbitrage, therefore, enabling 
investors to take a riskless and costless position that takes advantage of the mispricing. 
Accordingly, Van Rensburg, Slaney and Hardy (1997) motivated that a two-factor APT-model 
incorporating the JSE FINDI (J250) and the JSE Mining Index (J258) as factors provide for a 
superior account of the way assets are priced on the JSE compared to the traditional CAPM 
of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). The APT-model can be formulated as 
follows: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝐵𝑗1 𝑅𝑚𝑡1   + 𝐵𝑗2 𝑅𝑚𝑡2    + ….. 𝐵𝑗𝑛  𝑅𝑚𝑡𝑁   
Where: 
▪ (𝑅𝑖) is the expected return of security j. 
▪ 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate. 
▪ 𝐵𝑗1  is the sensitivity of the jth asset to factor 1, this is also called factor loading. 




Grinold and Kahn (2000: 173) and Kruger (2011) arguest that an APT model provides for an 
explanatory expected model of asset returns that are not constrained by the identification of a 
market portfolio, it does not in itself identify the priced risk factors that influence asset returns. 
It is for this reason that the APT-model is called an ''arbitrary" pricing theory (Grinold and Kahn, 
2000: 174). Grinold and Kahn (2000: 173) concluded that the APT model is an interesting and 
powerful alternative to capital asset pricing in comparison to CAPM. 
 
2.3 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical considerations according to which the 
effects of the information content of unexpected earnings events of JSE security returns can 
be analysed. This forms part of the development of the hypotheses together with the 
methodology used in testing for the proposed hypotheses to determine the effects of the 
unexpected earnings events on the price formation process of the JSE security price. 
Although, both CAPM and APT model employ proxies such as broad market indices for asset 
pricing in an attempt to approximate the market portfolio, the latter does not require the 
specification of a market portfolio and has fewer restrictive assumptions than the CAPM or 












3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter conducts an empirical literature review on the informational content of accounting 
income numbers, security return and anticipated events of other timelier sources of 
information. 
This study reviews key literature conducted on the efficient capital market hypothesis (EMH), 
consequently, investigations on the effect of the unexpected earnings on the share/security 
prices and whether any observation of significant abnormal returns.  The study presupposition 
is that JSE resembles a semi-strong form of efficiency then if so the security prices adjust 
instantaneously to unexpected news events (Bhana, 1994).   
 
This assumption is informed by Phiri’s (2015) view that the literature presents conflicting 
evidence about the form of market efficiency more pronounced for developing and emerging. 
In the context of SA, an example of studies that provided conflicting evidence on the efficiency 
of SA market are Knight’s (1983), Kornik’s (2005), Mlambo and Biekpe (2007),  Mlonzi, Kruger 
& Nthoesane (2011), Murie (2014) and Cata (2015), among others. Therefore, no expected 
relationship between the sign and size of unexpected earnings and that of ARs, and the 
security returns are not predictable subsequent to the news events. 
 
This chapter provides for a broad overview of the international literature and emerging markets 
investigation of the decision-usefulness of the management forecasts (compulsory and 
voluntary) and unexpected annual earnings.  
 
 
3.2 FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING DISCLOSURES ON THE FIRMS’ VALUE  
 
The rationale of an informationally efficient market is that at any given particular point no or 
insignificant private held information. In a semi-strong form of an efficient market, arbitrage 
profits are effectively eliminated. The demand for internally generated performance 
information helps to bridge any information gaps, therefore, to correctly measure the firm’s 





The disclosure of a firm’s performance and going concern state are presented in the income 
statement (i.e performance), balance sheet (i.e position) and cash flow (ie financial strength 
and liquidity). The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) produce higher earnings 
quality which tends to better reflect the firm’s economic position and performance, 
consequently, shows a stronger association between security prices, earnings and book 
value. All of the financial and nonfinancial information is presented in the financial report which 
must consist of several disclosures relating to compliance with statutory and regulatory 
requirements, namely, Companies Act No.71 of 2008 and JSE listing requirements2. Investors 
rely on this information as an important input in assessing a firm’s sustainability, prospects 
and value. 
 
The security price-sensitive factors are broadly classified into micro and macro-economic 
factors, ie firms’ specific events and other outside various issues (Holman, 2018). The focus 
of the study is on the rate of change in earnings disclosed in the unexpected earnings, 
however, the release statement consists of several macro factors, namely: commodity prices, 
foreign exchange movements, economic situation, currency devaluation, inflation and interest 
rate. And, other company-specific factors, namely: cost-saving initiatives, improved 
operational delivery, accounting policy (eg inventory gain – tax implications), capital 
expenditure, debt structure, interest savings, divestment, disinvestment, business model 
expansion, investment in new business, restructuring, infrastructure, exports and imports. The 
non-financial release disclosures are consistent with Dr. Holman (2018) a multi factor-model 
consisting of the metal index, interest rate (ie 5 or 10 years repo rate), inflation rate, currency, 
beta, economy (ie GDP growth), stock size (small vs large capitalisation), leverage, 
unemployment rate, values such as price to book value or price-earnings (P/E) ratios, 
momentum (market biases – a big thing). 
 
The assessment of the intrinsic value of the firm’s security emanates from the investor’s 
examination of the disclosed micro and macro-economic factors. Accordingly, Grinold and 
Kahn (2000: 199) describe the modern theory as a basis for the valuation of security values 
to risk-adjusted expected cash flows or future sustainable earnings. Furthermore, the modern 
theory of asset valuation is generally conducted using a single factor (ie CAPM) (Sharpe, 
1964) and multi-factor (ie APT) model (Ross, 1976). 
 
 





The market efficiency consists of price efficiency shown in the observable patterns in security 
returns (technical analysis) and information efficiency shown by the market responses (ie 
fundamental analysis). The investor uses this information is used to predict future 
profits/earnings to measure or calculate the true value of the security. Dechow (1994) found 
earnings to have a stronger association and correction with stock returns than net cash flows 
or cash from operations over short measurement intervals. This study focuses on the short-
run investor reaction or adjusted of the expectation to unexpected earning disclosures. 
 
In conclusion to the above discussion, there are several important factors around the 
unexpected earnings announcement that articulate the reasons behind security the price 
movement not only limited to a rate of change in earnings but other factors as well. It is 
therefore strongly believed that the multi factor-model provides for a great explanatory power 
on the direction and size of the market reaction in line with the ‘good’ and /or ‘bad’ news 
portfolio. This acknowledges that the market responses and/ or activities to timely sources of 
information about multi price-sensitive factors are to explain the duration and size of the effect 
of the unexpected event news on the security prices. 
 
 
3.3 UNEXPECTED EARNINGS AND SUBSEQUENT PRICES FORMATION  
 
The capital market efficiency, supposedly, provides for a framework upon which an 
understanding of the relationship between market information consumption and asset price 
valuation is to be investigated. Information efficiency must mean that market prices accurately 
and quickly reflect the new information. An investor must have quickly identified the market 
event news,  correctly assessed the information in line with other timelier sources of 
information, and maximise his rational decision, supposedly, in line with the news sign. The 
capital market efficiency by definition must mean the information and price efficiency are a 
reflection of timelier sources of information. The capital market efficiency means the security 
return emanating from the market reaction to the extent of new and sufficiently material 
information in the context of other timelier sources of information. Therefore, the efficiency of 
the market is measured by the security return or price movement emerging from new and 
sufficiently material information, in the context of other timelier sources of information. 
 
This definition is expressed in Fama's (1991) view that EMH, by implication, means the ‘newly’ 
available information is materially reflected in the security price. However, in Lev and Ohlson’s 
(1982) view an investor must have shown a certain amount of interest, appetite and stance 




security price movement. The security valuations to an extent of 85 to 90 (Ball and Brown, 
1968) and 85 to 98 (Kornik, 2005) percent consist of the publicly available market information, 
while the rest is from privately held information, therefore, only the ‘earnings surprise’ is 
impounded into the security prices at the event date. 
The study aims to answer the questions of (1) pre-release event price direction movement, (2) 
the extent of the effects of ‘earnings surprise’, (2) the association between release and /or 
earnings announcement to the security returns, (4) the period subsequent to release and /or 
announcement, ie the duration of the effects, and (5) to explain the association between the 
‘good’ and /or ‘bad’ news portfolio of unexpected earnings and abnormal returns. 
In conclusion, according to Lev and Ohlson (1982) consumption patterns or the market 
reaction are caused by the usefulness of the information or no use of the information at all. 
The selected literature, especially in the South Africa context, will assist in the critical analysis 
of the previously constructed and formulating of new hypotheses to discuss further under the 
research methodology and hypotheses chapter.  
 
3.3.1. Earnings announcement and subsequent investor reaction 
 
Kornik (2005) and Murie (2014) found the unexpected annual earnings to contain new 
information with a conclusion that “there is a portion of new information in the earnings figure”.  
However, the issuance of interim reports and trading statement releases lack the significant 
market reaction suggesting that investors await confirmation from the earnings 
announcement. This to a certain extent is contrary to the view of Lev and Ohlson (1982) that 
the market reaction is caused by the usefulness of the information or no use of the information 
at all. Whereas or while market participants wait until the uncertainty with regards to the 
specific reasons on the information contained in the unexpected earnings to either be 
confirmed or disproved via the release of actual earnings announcements.  
 
Perhaps a closer consideration of Dr. Holman's (2018) multi factor-model could provide 
explanatory power to prior unexpected event news security valuations to an extent of 85 to 90 
percent (Ball and Brown, 1968) and 85 to 98 percent (Kornik, 2005). The rationale is that when 
all of these price-sensitive factors are considered at once and rated accordingly the market 
reaction or lack thereof will explain the usefulness of the market information from a specific 
market event news. 
 
This phenomenon reinforces the view that the mere presence of the ‘new’ information but 




investor reaction could be an indication that the information is not entirely ‘new’ as it was partly 
captured in the previously published information. If so, the information efficiency oath to 
precede price efficiency, however, reinforces or validates the earlier. 
 
This study is based on the premise that JSE listing requirements of the general disclosure 
obligation through trading statement release which excludes issuers that publish quarterly 
results from compliance with the detailed requirements of paragraph 3.4(b)(i) to (viii) (JSE 
Service Issue 14, 2011). Furthermore, the study investigates the immediate effect of 
unexpected earnings and whether it is sufficient to predict future returns given the state of 
information efficiency in the market and whether it renders abnormal returns of approximately 
zero.  
 
3.3.2 Expectation and share price  
 
This study does not test whether abnormal returns are significantly higher for firms meeting 
the market's expectation, ie measured in line with the analyst forecast model and /or 
unexpected earnings measures or models. According to Kornik (2005), the analyst forecast 
model produces a larger magnitude of abnormal returns, the analysts have the timing 
advantage of being able to incorporate recent information and having access to a wider base 
of information than the simple comparison of earnings. 
 
In contrast to Kornik’s (2005) view, what is logical is Foster’s et al. (1984) return based 
unexpected earnings models that track security prices movement, which in turn is reflective of 
the market sentiment at a given point in time, therefore, a true reflection of information 
efficiency and it produces a better outcome that is reflective of price efficiency. The study 
seeks to determine the market’s reaction to unexpected earnings news, is a combination of 
meeting and /or exceeding the expectation, and measuring the duration and magnitude of the 
effect to the expected future earnings. The higher expected future earnings stem from a 
flexible and contextualised analyst forecast model that may have assigned a higher firm's 
valuation value to firms meeting expectations consistently. A multi-factor model (Dr. Holman, 
2018) will resemble the characteristics of timing factors (ie rating of factors) and incorporating 
wider price-sensitive factors similar to analyst access to a wide information base. 
 
It is important to provide clarity and be quick to acknowledge that expectations by definition 
are emotions and feelings absorbed and driven by the presence of a variety of factors that 





3.3.2.1 Elton, Gruber and Gultekin (1981) 
 
Elton, Gruber and Gultekin (1981) emphasized the view that investor expectations are based 
on the firm’s and economic factors and determine the security prices. Lev and Ohlson (1982) 
present a contrasting opposite view that beliefs and expectations are determined and induced 
by security prices, ie price efficiency. Information efficiency must set in motion the investor’s 
beliefs and expectations reflected in the security price movement and pattern. This perspective 
is somewhat supported by Beaver, et al. (2005) in that the reassessment of beliefs and change 
of expectations result in an investor reaction. 
 
The researcher is of the view that it is important to concede that human occurrence does 
precede a specific market event of interest, in other words, the investor reaction is not 
necessarily resulted from a reassessment of the immediate firm and economic factors at the 
time of information release. This despite Firth's (1976) argument where he states that “we 
expect the stock market to re-evaluate the worth of the share, at the time of the release of 
accounting or financial information”.  
 
Elton, et al (1981) subject this to very little research examining expectational data and claims 
that the knowledge of earnings forecast cannot lead to an excess return because this 
information is already priced in. They argued that an investor earns excess returns when 
stocks are undervalued and you must possess the knowledge (ie information and skill) of the 
stocks that are due for greater revision. They conceded that there is very little empirical 
evidence to support the strength of this expectational data and the knowledge of earnings 
forecast. This is assigned to the measurement of the impact of expectations utilizing historical 
extrapolations of past data to serve as a proxy for expectational data. The discrepancies 
between historical and expectation data are formulated in the form of a misestimate in the 
consensus earnings forest (ie forecast error) as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑡  = 𝐸𝑡 - 𝐶𝑡  
Then  
 
%𝑀𝑡 =  
𝐸𝑡 −  𝐶𝑡  
𝐸𝑡
    
Where: 
▪ %𝑀𝑡 is the percentage forecast error at time t. 
▪ 𝐸𝑡  is reported earnings per share at time t. 




Based on findings, collected data suggests that the share price is affected by expectations of 
earnings per share or accrual accounting and /or financial information. 
 
3.3.3 Earnings and share price  movement 
 
Other noteworthy event studies3 in explaining the extent of the usefulness of the market 
information from a piece of specific market event news. The event test and measures the 
degree of security prices adjustment to new information. 
 
3.3.3.1 Michael Firth (1976) 
 
Firth’s (1976) empirical research focused on the value of the accounting information and to 
measure the impact on security prices in the United Kingdom (UK). The basic market model 
used, borrowed from the United States (US), to calculate the expected prices follows the 
Sharpe (1963, 1964) formula: 
 
𝑅𝑗= 𝐴𝑗+ 𝐵𝑗 𝑅𝑚 
Where: 
▪ 𝑅𝑗 is the expected proportionate change in the price of security j at time t. 
▪ 𝑅𝑚 is the proportionate change in a general index of share prices at time t. 
▪ 𝐴𝑗 and 𝐵𝑗 are parameters estimated by the least-squares regression for each security 
j. 
 
As time progressed different researchers agrees with the model’s validity in offering 
satisfactory measurement techniques (Firth, 1976). However, the parameters of the market 
model for UK securities tested by Cunningham (1973) found the value of ‘𝑎’ not statistically 
different from zero (Firth, 1976).  Thus the following model (the variables as explained above):  
 
𝑅𝑗= 𝐵𝑗 𝑅𝑚 
 
The market model used is a cross-sectional residual (ie prediction error) that measures the 
security price in the periods surrounding the announcement of the accounting and financial 
information (Firth, 1976). The cross-sectional cumulative impact measures the security price 
movement as a percentage of the expected security movement over the same period. 
 




Hereafter referred to as the Abnormal Performance Index (API) measure (adapted by Cata, 






𝑁  ∏  (1 +  𝑉𝑛𝑚)
𝑀
𝑚   
Where: 
▪ N is the number of securities. 
▪ M is the end of the period (in months) over which the security is held. 
▪ 𝑉𝑛𝑚 is the residual return of each security n in month m. 
 
The market model prediction calculations were more accurate before the announcement. This 
prior announcement is critical in detecting any potential security return generation in the 
direction of the news sign. This captures the impact, if any, of information leakage or market 
anticipation of the unexpected event news before the release or announcement. However,  
from the event date (day zero) the residuals (ie prediction error) moves away from the 
expected value of zero. For ‘good’ news showed a rise of 2.1% from zero, ie, on average the 
security price rose by 2.1 % above the market mode predicted price. 
 
3.3.3.2 Ball and Brown (1968) & Ball and Kothari (1994) 
 
Ball and Brown (1968) observed that accounting theorists generally employed certain 
analytical models aligned to their thinking. The preferred model may have comprised only a 
few assertions or a rigorously developed argument. The identified method's shortcomings are 
that it ignores significant sources of knowledge, namely, the predictions of the model that 
conforms to the observed behaviour of naive and regression expected earnings models.  They 
a supportable analytical inquiry oath to embraces all supportable assumptions that explain the 
predictive powers of the propositions.  
 
Ball and Brown (1968) argued that the accounting theorist's analytical models' main limitations 
of a completely analytical approach are demonstrated through accounting numbers that 
cannot be defined substantively as they lack "meaning” and that is of doubtful usefulness. 
They constructed naive and regression expected earnings models on what the expected 
income is to be and subsequently investigated the market reaction when the expectation was 
not met: 
▪ Naïve model: assume previously comparable period results are equal to the current 




▪ Regression model: assume that the earnings of different firms are related due to 
pervasive economic or market conditions and used two variables in the form of net 
income and EPS. 
 
The CAPM is used to calculate the expected earnings to which the actual earnings are 
subtracted to arrive at the unexpected earnings. The abnormal return is derived from 
subtracting market return from the actual return as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑖𝑡) 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 – 𝐸 ((𝑅𝑖𝑡)| 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡) 
Where: 
▪ 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected/market return on asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
▪ 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the actual return on asset 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
▪ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the abnormal return on share 𝑖 in time t  
Furthermore, this study also assesses the usefulness of accounting income numbers by 
examining the information content and timeliness. The finding was that about 85 to 90 percent 
of the market reaction took place prior to the release of annual earnings. This was attributed 
to other timelier sources of information such as interim reports. The finding is supported by 
Ball and Kothari (1994) who found substantial share price movement occurring in the periods 
preceding the earnings announcement. Kornik (2005) found the issuance of interim reports 
and trading statement releases to lack significant market reaction and concluded that investors 
await confirmation from the earnings announcement. The investor-related behaviors or 
reactions perhaps stem from potential information leakage, market anticipation of other 
sensitive information and legitimate information dissemination. The value of information or the 
market reaction is quantified using the 𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑀 (refer to above formula). 
 
3.3.4 Unexpected earnings event and security returns drift 
 
Foster et al. (1984) provide an explanation for systematic Post Earnings Announcement Drifts 
(PEADs) of the security returns with expectations models based on time series of earning and 
security return. The study found that PEADs are a persistent phenomenon over time and 
associated with the sign or magnitude of unexpected earnings changes. The four models 
used, namely, two were based on earnings forecast and the other two on share returns, the 
latter focusing on short-run and a longer timeframe to measure the market reaction. 
In the SA context, Kornik (2005), Murie (2014) and Cata (2015) confirmed the association 




earnings announcement and sign and the magnitude of security returns. These studies also 
observed the predictable abnormal returns drift in the period subsequent to the study event 
day. 
 
In chapter 4 the study further elaborates on the selected short-run market reaction model to 
the direction and size of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios in and around unexpected event 
news of [-2; +2], [-2; +0], [-2; +1], [+0; +1], [+0; +2] unexpected earnings model or measures 
and /or days variation and a drift of  [1; +2] and  [3; +5] window period. 
 
3.4 EARNINGS EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY  
 
Kothari and Warner (2006) indicate that short-horizon methods are quite reliable, whereas, 
the long horizon has serious limitations, albeit, improved. The event study outcomes vary 
depending on the period and sample firms' characteristics. Certainly, the size of the firm, 
liquidity, volatility, market sentiments and all other price-sensitive factors contributes to the 
type of outcome received.  According to Kothari and Warner (2006), the contributing factors 
reinforce the importance of using stratified samples to examine event study statistical 
properties. The study sample can be stratified based on the mentioned price-sensitive factors 
to included a split between voluntary and compulsory management forecast, changes in 
earnings of similar firms, previous and recent company-specific market events and perhaps 
the calendar time of these events.  
 
The key features of this event study are to identify the event of interest together with the timing 
of occurrence. The importance of the selected timeframe is to closely monitor and assessed 
the impact of the event’s variable of interest, i.e unexpected earnings news to the observation 
of the security price movement. The literature review focuses on the selected window period 
of the event of interest, such as the trading statement releases and year-end earnings 
announcements. The publication dates are the earliest of the preliminary report, the annual 
financial statement, or the provisional report for earnings numbers publication and release 
date for trading statement. 
 
3.5  RECENT UNEXPECTED EARNINGS EVENT STUDIES  
 
This section reviews past and most recent studies on the association of unexpected earnings 
events and security returns. The reviewed literature considered the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news 




of the security price movement from emerging to developed markets. The explored literature 
is indicated below. 
 
3.5.1 The information content of the magnitude of unexpected earnings 
 
The most recent SA studies are of Kornik (2005) Murie (2014) and Cata (2015) found a positive 
relationship between the sign and size of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios and the magnitude 
of abnormal security returns. The studies employed similar market models to assess the price 
formation process using simple expectation and unexpected earnings and analysts forecast 
EPS models to establish and evaluate the association and the effect of ‘earnings surprise’ and 
announcements. Elton, et al, (1981) criticised the use of traditional earnings estimation models 
that employs historic data to proxy the market expectation, as a consequence to measure the 
reaction, in favour of developing and utilising the expectational data through historical 
extrapolations of past data. 
Kornik's (2005) and Cata's (2015) study presupposition was that the JSE is a semi-strong 
efficient market form. Whereas Murie's (2014) study invalidates market efficiency at the 
semistrong-form level as the security prices do not adjust instantaneously to new information 
contained in earnings releases, but rather over time. In SA several studies are challenging the 
JSE semi-strong efficient market theory partly because of the observed price inefficiency, ie 
security prices continued drift post releases or the earnings announcement. Contrasting study 
results on the post-release drift, Murie (2014) found significant post-release drift, albeit, based 
on a short-term model or days variation and Cata’s (2015) found a lack of significant drift in 
the post-earnings announcement period support and against semi-strong efficient market 
form, respectively. Ball and Brown (1968), Foster (1984), Ball (1992) and Kornik (2005) found 
in favour of semi-strong efficient market form.  
Johnson and Zhao (2012) note a persistent but overlooked evidence of contrarian share price 
reactions to earnings surprises that often in the opposite direction. However, in extreme 
‘earnings surprises’, the contrarian share returns are slightly less prevalent. And, concluded 
that the incidental contrarian share returns behaviour is statistically related to ‘‘noise’’ in the 
measured earnings surprises. The ‘noise’ consists of opposite revenue changes, earnings 
forecast revision, returns volatility and interim earnings surprises.  
Beaver, Clarker & Wright (1979) expanding from Ball and Brown's (1968) primary concern of 
the examination of a no association hypothesis examined the association of unexpected 
earnings and the magnitude of abnormal share return. Examining both the sign and magnitude 




hypothesis. They held a view that with properly constructed and direct research questions the 
treatment of the earnings forecast error may become more critical. The market model on which 
unsystematic security returns are measured herein defined as “residuals” are based: 
  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝐵𝑗 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
▪ 𝑅𝑖𝑡 rate of return (percentage change in price including dividends) for security 𝑖 at time 
t. 
▪ 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the rate of return in period t on a "market" portfolio of common stocks, where 
each stock's return is weighted according to its relative market value 
▪ 𝑖𝑡 is the unsystematic return on security i in period t; 
▪ 𝑎𝑖 + βj are the intercept and slope coefficients specific to security 𝑖 
Beaver, Clarker & Wright’s (1979) study outcome confirmed the existence of the association 
between unsystematic returns and the magnitude of earnings forecast errors. 
 
3.5.2 The management earnings forecasts and share price returns 
 
The trading statement releases consist of voluntary and compulsory management forecast 
after a prima facie evidence is obtained on the profit forecast or estimate supported by the 
company’s other source of information distribution (JSE Service Issue 14, 2011). Management 
provides information not already available in public to allow the investors to re-assess their 
beliefs and expectation to now be reflected in the updated intrinsic value of the security. Insofar 
as to the voluntary releases, the rationale behind management forecast could be informed by 
various things, for example, to re-evaluate the intrinsic value of the security to reflect the firm’s 
future potential. It has the potential to correct the current investor sentiments driven by factors 
outside the management control.  
Patell (1976) examines the relationship between the information content of management 
voluntary forecasts disclosures and security price behaviour.  A similar methodology to that of 
Ball and Brown (1968) was followed and used management earnings forecasts as the 
expected earnings. At times the management lacks accounting principles since it precludes 
an independent verification process in preparing management forecasts. In the SA context, 
the listing requirements compel the sponsor to ensure that an issuer complies with paragraph 
2.11 on profit forecast (JSE Service Issue 14, 2011). Patel (1976) confirms that earnings 





3.6  SECURITY PRICE MOVEMENT EVENT POSSIBILITIES  
 
Many situations and factors are affecting the security price movement of a listed firm. The 
change in security returns varies owing to change in these situations ordinarily emanating from 
the market or firm. The variation in the security price creates an expectation of the firms’ 
economic health. In this section we focus on the market situations, namely trading halts, 
commodity circle and general retailers sub-index. 
 
3.6.1  Trading Halts or market closure 
 
Trading halts are the suspension of the impacted security from trading a day before the 
corporate event. This leads to a scheduled market closure resulting from this corporate event 
or reaction to company news (event). The security trading is halted pending the announcement 
or implementation of the corporate event. FTSE Russell Index Policy (2018) defines corporate 
events to be a reaction to company news (event) that might impact the security price. 
 
3.6.2  Commodity circle – resource sector 
 
The resource security value is affected due to the cyclical nature of commodity demand or 
circle.  The security returns vary accordingly during these circles that may result in short-term 
losses, however, over a long period the equity resources value might be attractive. 
Graph 1: Resource index 
 





The observation from figure 1 shows prices at highest between 2014 and 2015, however, they 
began to fall till 2016 thereafter increased below the highs. It is worth noting between 2010 to 
2014 the index moved sideways and this was during the study period of Murie (2014) and 
Cata (2015). The study period covers the highest and lowest with an upwards trajectory since 
2016. 
 
3.6.3. General retailers sub-index – retail sector  
 
Statistics SA (2019) produced a retail sales report on a conducted and released monthly 
survey at 13:00 of the retail trade industry covering retail enterprises including general 
retailers, food, beverages and tobacco, pharmaceutical and medical goods, cosmetics and 
toiletries, textiles, clothing, footwear and leather goods, household furniture, appliances and 
equipment; hardware, paint and glass, and all ‘other’ retailers. To improve the timeliness of 
this information at times stats SA (2019) had to estimate due to late response, however, 
revised in future statistical releases as soon as information becomes available. 
 
3.6.4. Analyst forecast releases 
 
The analyst earnings forecasts are an important element of the market information 
dissemination and are either collaborated or contrasted with the management forecast. 
According to Kornik (2005), analyst forecasts are a more accurate measure and an important 
measure of expectations than prior-year earnings. 
 
Trading halts, commodity circle and analyst forecast, among others, could provide for an 
explanatory power on the effect of other timelier sources of information to unexpected event 
news. This could assist to explain the contrarian return and the magnitude of price movement 
on the event date. 
 
3.7 THE FINANCIAL MARKET  
3.7.1  Evidence from the international markets 
 
The major global markets consist of many countries such as the US, Japan, and Europe, 
Germany, France, Italy, and the UK to name a few. And, emerging market economies (EMEs), 
namely: Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Central and Eastern European 




A substantial body of literature confirms the presence of the effects of liquidity, several market 
factors and the size of global markets participants on the association earnings surprise with 
stock prices. The literature argued the impact of diverse factors on asset pricing, albeit, difficult 
to compare across different methodologies, events periods, and data frequencies.  
The commonalities between international, emerging and local markets are generally the 
financial infrastructure such as the renowned Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications (SWIFT), South African Multiple Option Settlement (SAMOS) – payment 
and settlement system, regulation such as the Securities Transfer Tax Act no 25 of 2007) 
(STT Act) and self-regulatory organisations (SROs) such as Strate for oversight and 
regulation, embracing and emulating regulations from International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO). However, other differentiators may include the level of market 
efficiency, accounting standards and securities regulation.  
It has been discovered that liquidity is an essential price factor in emerging markets emanating 
from the size of the securities exchange, market participants or investors and concentration of 
relative trading volume. Perhaps the combination of these market features a determinant of 
the market efficiency form.  Thus far, the literature reviews across different markets confirm 
the earnings-price relationship the biggest predicting factors of security returns not discounting 
the other diverse factors mentioned earlier. The study elaborates further on the emerging 
markets due to unique market factors such as size and liquidity, thereon, market efficiency. 
3.7.2  Evidence from the emerging markets  
 
A simple definition of emerging markets is economies and stock markets progressing towards 
becoming advance (Kenton, 2019). The differentiating factors include liquidity in debts and 
equity markets, size of market exchanges, financial infrastructure which including systems, 
institutions such as banks and regulatory environment. The number of the emerging markets 
are as follows: International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies, 23; Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) classifies, 24; Standard and Poor's (S&P), 23; Russell classifies, 19 and 
Dow Jones classifies 22 countries (Kenton, 2019). Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa for a part of BRICS and all of the five countries are part of emerging markets exchanged. 
South Africa is the only African country of the five BRICS institutions.  
Bajbai (2019) stated that in Sub-Saharan Africa about 29 stock exchanges are representing 
38 countries which include two regional exchanges. The table below depicts (as of October 
31, 2018) 15 select stock exchanges showing dollar-adjusted returns by each country. The 




measured against the S&P500, as of October 31, 2018. The selected 10 year period is the 
time frame where South Africa shows a positive dollar-adjusted return. 
Graph 2: The dollar-adjusted returns stock exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: investinginafrica.com (table adapted to a graph) 
The above performance graph indicates or illustrates the important factors for dollar-adjusted 
returns consisting of market factors, size and liquidity explaining market efficiency, thereon, 
security returns. The explanatory power of the emerging market countries' security returns is 
the exchanges' unique factors, the size of market capitalisation, development and 
sophistication of financial systems. The literature argues that liquidity risk is of significance in 
the emerging stock markets where the size of securities and investors is scarce and trading 
volumes are lower.  
Beirne, Caporale, Ghattas & Spagnolo's (2010) paper examined the mature global market and 
emerging market (regional) spillovers into local emerging stock markets. The focus was on 41 
emerging market economies (EMEs) in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The 
study confirms that literature uses different methodologies, periods and data frequencies, 
although, applied a uniform specification to all 41 EMEs. The literature results of a study event 
must be interpreted with a careful collaborative, investigative and expansive analysis to 
contextualise the outcomes to that local market. Beirne et al (2010) study provided empirical 
evidence of spillovers from global and regional markets through the transmission of shocks 
(news) across markets and cross-border links into the emerging stock market returns. The 
















11 exchanges - Dollar-adjusted returns - Oct. 31, 2018 




3.7.3  Evidence from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange  
 
Knight’s unpublished Ph.D. (1983, quoted by Murie, 2014) examined the effects of earnings 
announcements on the share price. The study event of classified ‘earnings surprises’ into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ news, adopted naive and regression market models and applied API to 
cumulate abnormal returns. The study provided evidence to significant market response to 
earning surprise and observed a return drift following the announcement.  
Kornik's (2005) study partly contrasted two stock exchanges, namely, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) based on liquidity (JSE - less) and 
size of the stock exchange (JSE - small).  The empirical evidence on the relationship between 
accounting earnings and share returns was predominantly observed in NYSE and the same 
results were confirmed on the JSE. The earnings forecast was regarded as expected earnings 
and compared to actual earnings announced to compute the abnormal returns. The ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ portfolios are classified based on the sign of the forecast error to explain the effect of 
‘earnings surprise’ on the size, direction and sign of the stock returns. 
Furthermore, the model used to estimate the expected earnings were ranked and results 
divided into deciles based on the sign and magnitude of the absolute analyst forecast errors 
using the same formula by Foster et al. (1984): 
𝑈(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡) =  
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡)  
 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
 
The abnormal return is calculated as 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 – 𝐸 ((𝑅𝑖𝑡)| 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡). The risk inherent in the 
asset (ie unsystematic or specific risk) was regarded as the same as the systemic risk, i.e. 
beta assumed to be equal to one. 
 
Murie (2014) and Cata (2015) were the first studies to focus primarily on examining the 
information content of trading statement releases with the adopted methodology were from 
Foster et al. (1984), Beaver (1968) and Kornik (2005) as follows:  
   
𝐹𝐸𝑖



















𝑆𝑇  and  𝐹𝐸𝑖
𝑀𝑇 are forecast errors for ST – short term and MT – medium term  
▪  ũ𝑖,𝑡 are the cumulative three-day abnormal returns over the short-run event, ie, the 
two days preceding and the day of the earnings announcement. 
▪ (ũ𝑖,𝑡) is the standard deviation of the cumulated abnormal return over the 60 *(M) and 
100 *(C) trading-day period prior to the short term [- 2, 1] (M) and [- 1, 1] *(C) and 
medium [-60, -5] *(M) events period being examined. 
▪ *(M) – Murie and *(C) – Cata.  
In summary, the target firms were in the top 40 and 60 with a sample size of 58 and 128 
trading statement releases for Murie (2014) and Cata (2015), respectively. Both studies found 
the sign and magnitude of unexpected earnings were significantly correlated with the sign and 
magnitude of the CAR. 
 
3.7.4 Review of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange  
3.7.4.1 Introduction  
 
There distinguished global and regional stock exchange factors which include the effects of 
liquidity, market factors (eg interest rates), size (eg market capitalisation and number of 
participants) and the direction of the market sentiments at a given time play into the examined 
predictability of returns in the JSE.  
Kruger (2011) examined the predictability of returns in JSE, in a way testing for market 
efficiency, using linear and nonlinear models to draw a conclusion on their forecasting 
capabilities over both stable periods and over the market crisis. The study confirmed the 
existence of predictable periods in share returns, however, the timing and occurrence of these 
predictable periods were confirmed less obvious. He concluded that because the newly 
generated information is unpredictable (ie timing and occurrence) that explains the sensitivity 
of the price movement. The unpredictable announcements when combined with the extent of 
the investor reaction, either over- or under-reaction, is the source of the apparent profitability 
(ie abnormal returns). The evidenced unpredictability nature of the stock price returns is 







3.7.4.2 Size and liquidity  
 
According to JSE (n.d.), the size of the exchange as measured by market capitalisation is 
currently ranked 19th in the world and the largest in the African continent.  The expansion of 
JSE stems from significant events that include the acquisitions of Futures Exchange (SAFEX) 
in 2001 and the Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) in 2009. Now, consists of five financial 
markets, namely, Equities and Bonds as well as Financials, Commodity and Interest Rate 
Derivatives. However, the focus of the studies is on the equity market with almost 400 
companies listed on the exchange across the mainboard and AltX. Two benchmark indices 
are consisting of the FTSE/JSE All Share Index, covering 99% of market capitalisation, and 
the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index which tracks the top listings in a representative spread of sectors. 
The evidence suggests that asset pricing anomalies in the South African market largely 
correspond with those in international markets (Kruger, 2011). The study test failed to attribute 
the size effect to the asset pricing anomalies. Van Rensburg (2002) suggested that the size 
effect as a factor in asset pricing anomalies was because the exclusion of small-cap stocks 
from the samples based on thin trading adjustments resulted in the outcome of such said 
studies.  
The liquidity of SA financial instruments in comparison to the size of the economy is 
disproportionately larger than for comparable countries (JSE Limited Integrated Annual 
Report, 2017). The local register reflects 63 percent of JSE liquidity. It stated that the size of 
the market is relatively large, however, fewer participants lead to a concentration in the JSE’s 
which in turn affects liquidity. 
 
3.7.4.3 Segmentation on the JSE The 
 
Van Rensburg (2002) pointed out that the All-Share Index is conventionally employed as the 
market proxy in SA beta estimation which, is not mean-variance efficient. This renders the use 
of one factor model such as CAPM unproductive and does not hold on to the JSE. 
Furthermore, the study found that a two-factor APT model, namely, the Financial-Industrial 
(FINDI) and Resources/Mining indices (MINING) provides for a superior account of the way 






3.7.4.4 Disclosure requirements on the JSE  
 
JSE Limited Listings Requirements compel an issuer to comply with paragraph 3.4(b)(i) to 
(viii) except for those who publish quarterly results (Service Issue 14, 2011). Furthermore, all 
affected Issuers must publish a trading statement as soon as they are satisfied that a 
reasonable degree of certainty exists that the financial results for the period to be reported 
upon next will differ by at least 20% (Service Issue 14, 2011). Subsequently, if and when an 
issue becomes reasonably certain that their previously published number, percentage or 
range in the trading statement is no longer correct, then the issuer must publish another 
trading statement providing the revised number (Service Issue 14, 2011). However, the 
determination of a reasonable degree of certainty in terms of 3.4(b)(i) to (viii) is a judgment 
decision by an issuer and its directors to which JSE does not involve itself. 
The probability and rationale behind the trading statement publication are based on the firm’s 
management judgment call and may elect to comply with paragraph 3.4(b)(i) to (viii) voluntarily 
which makes differentiation a textbook exercise. This study target firms or issuers in the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 index that are required (ie compulsory) and elected (voluntary) to comply 
with the publishing of the trading statement in terms of paragraph 3.4(b)(i) to (viii). 
  
3.7 CONCLUSION  
 
 
The fundamental insight of the reviewed literature is that it sufficiently explains the market 
efficiency from a variety of forces and the market impounding of available information into 
security prices fast enough that arbitrage opportunities cannot be exploited systematically. 
The semi-strong form of EMH features prominently in the JSE and explains the phenomena 
of the relationship between accrual accounting income numbers, the intrinsic value of stocks 
and security returns. 
 
The international, regional and local literature indicates the existence and the impact thereof 
of diverse factors such as other price-sensitive market factors, size and liquidity on the asset 
price. Furthermore, the reviews indicate the test of market efficiency in all exchanges is arrived 
at using different methodologies, periods, and data frequencies hence the extent of the market 






THE RESEARCH PARADIGM AND METHODOLOGY APPROACH 
(Research Methodology and hypotheses, and Data) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The research study focuses more on a functionalist worldview, herein also referred to as 
consensus perspectives, with a qualitative methodological approach taken together with the 
use of a quantitative approach. This view is based on the definition by Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill (2009: 120) concerned with the rational explanation of behaviours and institutions 
such as why a particular organisational problem is occurring concerning its functions 
performed.  
According to Saunders et al. (2009: 120), the business structures or entities within this 
paradigm are seen as rational entities in which rational explanations offer solutions to rational 
problems and organisational endeavours. The rational behavioural expectation is in sync with 
the key assumptions underlining the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), that of the availability 
of information (efficiency) and the rationality of the market (price efficiency), i.e. prices respond 
immediately to new information.  
An issuer’s compulsory and voluntary trading statement releases and date of earnings 
announcements were obtained through Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) from IRESS. 













4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In ascertaining the effects of unexpected earnings or ‘earnings surprises’ and earnings 
announcements announced on the price formation process, the adopted approach is the 
return-based unexpected earnings models by Foster et al. (1984).  
The market return is determined using the two-factor APT model (Van Rensburg, 2002),  it 
shows the gains or losses when all and immediate market sentiments of the sizeable investors 
are fully reflected in the security price. The expected market return is calculated following the 
below steps, herein, referred MAND-GLEN steps: 
1) Using the regression model (𝑦𝑖  =   +  𝑏𝑥𝑖  +  𝑖), regress the returns of the Financial-
Industrial and Resource indices against the security return; 
2) Consider the results in step 1 to eliminate the effect of the correlation of the two indices; 
3) Removal of the interception (making constant zero)  and non-significant indices 
(measured by the insignificance of t-statistic outcome); 
4) Run the regression again and assorted with the significant index (either FIND or RESI); 
and  
5) Re-run the regression analysis with intercept, observe the results of the significant 
predictor, ie either FIND or RESI, and consider the expectation on the movement of 
adjusted r-squared as follows: 
▪ Consider the adjusted r-squared of steps 4 and 5, an increase mean the 
remaining predictor has a positive relationship with the measured security 
return.  
▪ In deciding to compare the coefficient of determination, R2 adjusted R-squared 
to consider which is better or whether the latter is greater.  
When the return predictors (i.e market return – FINDI and RESI) are equal to zero then the 
average security return is the market return. However, given the unlikelihood of the two 
predictors assuming values equal to zero hence it makes sense to remove the intercept. In 
such circumstances, the intercept doesn’t tell you anything about the relationship between 
security and market return. In addition, the removal of a non-significant index to eliminate the 
correlation between the two predictive variables (i.e market return predictors). Information gets 




to test for the quality of statistics. It is an objective way to decide on the fitness of models. The 
formula used is:  
𝐴𝐼𝐶 =  𝐼𝑛 
𝑆𝑟
𝑁




   is the maximized log-likelihood of the model parameters given the data and K 
is the number of estimable parameters, 𝑆𝑟 the residual sum of squares (SS), 𝑛 is a number of 
observations, and 𝑘 is the number of estimable parameters (excluding the intercept) that we 
have fit. The model with a better fit has a lower AIC value. Parameters (K or P) are equal to 
the degree of freedom (Dof), ie data points (observations). The acceptable AIC values are 
within 0 – 2 units examined against the remaining model parameter (i.e FINDI or RESI) after 
removing the non-significant index.  
This study seeks to establish the relationship between the security return (dependent variable) 
and two independent variables, namely FIND and RESI (i.e the predictors). Durbin-Watson 
statistics can be used to eliminate the predictors’ autocorrelation and /or to decide whether to 
reject the null hypothesis (Braun,  Altan and Beck, 2014). The Durbin-Watson statistics is 
defined as follows: 
   
Where the 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 – ŷi are the residuals, n the number of observations and k the number of 
predictors (exclude y-intercept).  
If d < 𝑑𝐿 reject 𝐻0 : ρ ≤ 0 (and so accept 𝐻1   : ρ > 0) 
If d > 𝑑𝑢 do not reject 𝐻0  : ρ ≤ 0 (presumably ρ = 0) 
If 𝑑𝐿 < d < 𝑑𝑢 test is inconclusive 
Durbin-Watson excel calculation is based on the regression analysis values, namely the sum 
of squared residual (SS) and residual values to determine the sum of squared differences of 
residuals. The computation of DW value is derived from dividing the sum of squared 
differences of residuals by the sum of squared residuals (Savin and White, 1977). Based on 
the rule of thumb the test statistic values are expected to be within the range of 1.5 to 2.5 to 
be considered relatively normal (refer to Appendix X). 
The share returns are examined in four distinct periods modified from Das et al. (2007) and 
Cata (2014) together with a complete observation or window periods as referred to in sections 




‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios in and around unexpected event news of [-2; +2], [-2; +0], [-
2; +1], [0; +1], [0; +2] unexpected earnings model or measures and /or days variation and a 
drift of  [1; +2] and  [3; +5] window period. 
 
 
4.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
 
The developed hypothesis is designed to determine the effects of unexpected earnings news 
on the JSE price formation process at the identified signal days. The discussed hypotheses 
together with the description of the research methodology followed in testing for these 
hypotheses revolves around a collection of the below data points: 
▪ The daily total returns herein referred to log return, include both the dividends and 
share price returns. 
- The daily total return is the difference between the initial cost of the security 
(𝑃0) and the closing security price (𝑃1) plus dividend/interest divide by the initial 
cost of the security (𝑃0). 
▪ A total or market return consists of the market index which includes JSE Financial-
Industrial and Resource indices. 
The considered hypotheses for the study are as follows: 
▪ The association between the unexpected earnings (i.e releases and announcements) 
new and security returns 
H1: The unexpected earnings contain material, sufficient and new information as 
reflected in investor reactions through a reassessment of beliefs and change of 
expectations (Beaver, et al., 2005). The hypothesis is as follows: 
• 𝐻0: (𝐴𝑅0| trading statements/announcements) = 0 
Statistically significant abnormal returns, provide evidence that unexpected 
earnings contain new and sufficient materially information, in the period 
surrounding the releases. 
• 𝐻1: (AR0| trading statements/announcements) ≠ 0 
No statistically significant abnormal returns, provide evidence that unexpected 
earnings do not contain new and sufficient materially information, in the period 




H2: The effects of the new information (i.e size and sign of unexpected earnings / 
‘earnings surprises’) reflected in releases and announcements are associated with the 
size and sign of abnormal returns. The hypothesis is as follows: 
• 𝐻0: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements/announcements and CAR) = 0  
 the sign of trading statements/announcements and the sign of CARs are 
independent 
• H1: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and CAR) ≠ 0  
 the sign of releases and announcements is associated with the sign of CARs. 
The Chi-Square statistic (𝑥2 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡) test the relationship between and within trading 
statement releases and calculated CARs to ascertain the significance thereof.  
▪ The magnitude of firms’ unexpected earnings on the abnormal share returns 
H3: The magnitude of firms’ unexpected earnings measures or the resultant forecast 
errors is positively associated with the magnitude of security returns. The hypothesis 
is as follows: 
• 𝐻0: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and CAR) = 0 
 No relationship between the magnitude of the unexpected earnings measures 
and CARs in the post-release period. 
• H1: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and CAR) ≠ 0  
 A positive relationship exists between the magnitude of the unexpected earnings 
measures and CARs in the post-release period. The Regression Analysis 
(𝑦𝑖  =   + 𝑏𝑥𝑖  +  𝑖) is used to determine the relationship between the size of the 
security price reaction to unexpected earnings or ‘surprise earning’ and abnormal 
returns. 
▪ The post-trading statement releases and announcement return drift 
H4: There is no association of rational momentum effects of market reaction post-
releases and preceding earnings announcements. Or 
H4: Abnormal returns are not earned in the period subsequent to unexpected earnings. 
The hypothesis is as follows: 
• 𝐻0: (𝐶𝐴𝑅1+𝑇 ) = 0   
 Abnormal returns are not earned in the (1, T) day period subsequent to 




• 𝐻0: (𝐶𝐴𝑅1+𝑇 ) ≠ 0   
 Abnormal returns are earned in the (1, T) day period subsequent to unexpected 
earnings. The sign is associated with the sign of CARs in the (1, T) day period 
subsequent to unexpected earnings. 
 
▪ The information content of unexpected annual earnings announcements 
H5: The market reaction at the time of the earnings announcement is negatively 
associated with the magnitude of the post-trading statement releases. The hypothesis 
is as follows: 
• 𝐻0: (𝐴𝑅0| actual earnings announcement) = 0 
Statistically significant abnormal returns following the publications of actual 
earnings announcements. 
• H1: (𝐴𝑅0| actual earnings announcement) ≠ 0 
No statistically significant abnormal returns following the publications of actual 
earnings announcements. 
H6: The association of investor reaction to actual earnings announcement and the 
security price movement in the post-trading statement period; OR 
H6: the effects of the price movement in the post-trading statement on investor reaction 
to an annual earnings announcement. The hypothesis is as follows: 
• 𝐻0: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and annual earnings announcement) = 0  
 No relationship between the magnitude of the post-trading statement release 
drift and investor reaction to the annual earnings announcement. 
• H1: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and annual earnings announcement) ≠ 0  
 A relationship between the magnitude of the post-trading statement release drift 
and investor reaction to the annual earnings announcement. The Regression 
Analysis (𝑦𝑖  =   + 𝑏𝑥𝑖  +  𝑖) is used to determine the relationship between the 
size of the share price reaction to the annual earnings announcement and the 








4.4 THE EVENT STUDY 
 
The primary event of interest is trading statement releases, followed by, the measure of the 
market’s reaction by observing a sample of firms'’ security returns behaviour at the time of 
event occurrence. The secondary is on the annual earnings announcements to assess the 
potential impact of the earnings announcement following the trading statement release. The 
data analysis indicates that on average the announcements follow releases by 17.5 days when 
excluding outliers decreased to 15.6 days inclusive of all days, however, Murie, (2014) is 9 
days and (Cata, 2015) is 13 days. 
When you look at the number of ‘good’ vs ‘bad’ news portfolios the market appeared more 
bullish in Cata’s (2015) and neutral in Murie’s (2014) which approximately mirrored the market 
sentiments. Whereas, in this study, the market sentiments appear more bearish towards the 
later years when observing the market capitalisation of the top 10 that constitute a total of 65 
percent weighting as of 31 January 2019 (FTSE Russell Factsheet, 2019). 
 
Figure 1: unexpected earnings events window period  
 
The timeline of the effects of the new information on the security price is observed reflected in 
Figure 1 (above) examining the market reaction: 
(i) Pre-event window period [-65, -1]  
The beta trailing window period or estimation period of 65 day periods preceding event 
window of [0, 0] to ascertain the rational expectations versus the investor expectations (i.e. 
estimation periods). 
(ii) Event window period [-2, 0], [0, 2] and [-2, 2]  
A two days trading period of [-2, 0] before and [0, 2] after unexpected earnings event and 
the variation of days surrounding the event day, i.e [-2, 2] event window. 




The primary focus on the period subsequent to the trading statement releases and preceding 
the actual earnings announcement and post annual earnings announcement.  
 
4.4.1 The unexpected earnings model or measures and portfolio classification 
 
The study classifies the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news portfolios based on the sign of the trading 
statement released using a simple expectations model and the magnitude and sign of the 
three unexpected earnings models. The study examines the prediction of the direction 
together with the magnitude of CARs in the period subsequent to trading statement releases 
and earnings announcements. The releases contain management’s forecast or ‘estimates’ of 
earnings changes to the previous comparable period reported results (Murie, 2014).  
Elton, Gruber and Gultekin (1981) criticise the traditional earnings estimation models that use 
historical data in an attempt to measure the impact of expectations, as opposed to 
expectational data to conduct historical extrapolations of past data, that the authors hope will 
serve as a proxy for expectational data. They claim that the event studies using historic data 
for earnings estimation models further reveal conspicuous shortcomings in their estimation 
pointed out by Elton et al. (1981) and it is because there is little research examining 
expectational data. Furthermore, Murie (2014) revealed that trading statements lack historical 
depth and are unpredictable therefore investors may perceive trading statement data to be 
immaterial.  
 
4.4.2 Simple expectations model classification 
 
In testing for the impact of the information content of the unexpected earnings on the security 
price, a simple expectation model is used to classify event news as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news 
portfolios based on the sign of the cautionary earnings announcement (Cata, 2015). 
 
4.4.3 The short-term returns-based unexpected earnings models  
 
In the measurement of the market reaction, this study uses both a simple expectation model 
and short-term security returns unexpected model of the unexpected earnings classified into 
good’ or ‘bad’ news portfolios based on the sign of trading statement (Cata, 2014). Foster et 
al., (1984) calculate the returns based on the unexpected earnings measures, thereby, 
focusing on the short-run market reaction to the ‘earnings surprise’ as follows: 
 
 𝐹𝐸𝑖










𝑆𝑅 is the forecast error. 
▪ 𝑡= −2
0 ũ𝑖,𝑡 are the cumulative five, three and two-day abnormal returns over the short-
run event, ie, the combination of the two days preceding and post, and the day of the 
earnings announcement. 
▪ (ũ𝑖,𝑡) is the standard deviation of the cumulated abnormal return over the 65-trading-
day period prior to the [0, 0] event period being examined. 
▪ The variation of days surrounding the event day are [- 2, -0] [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2] and 
[2, 2] event windows. 
Note that the [r, x] notation refers to the period from day r falling before the event date to the 
day x falling after the event date. On the event date, either r falls before or x falls after the 
event date. 
 
4.4.4 Abnormal return estimation calculations  
 
There are various benchmark return models, herein, also referred to as expected return 
models, used in the calculation of abnormal returns (Merwe, 2016).  Huberman and Wang 
(2005) state that the APT-model is one period to multi-periods that delivers arbitrage-free 
pricing of existing assets noting a factor structure of their return. And, investors believe that 
the stochastic properties of returns of capital assets are consistent with a factor structure. The 
returns are regressed on the factors, ie predictive variables or market return predictors and 
the model parameters or coefficients are used on benchmark securities returns to compute 
expected returns. 
 
Van Rensburg (2002) found that a dichotomy exists in the SA market and that the Financial-
Industrial (FINDI) and Resources/Mining indices (RESI) are the best market proxies for the 
JSE market returns. In the determination of the expected or benchmark returns, a two-factor 
model was used as the market observable proxies, namely the Financial-Industrial (FINDI) 
and Resources/Mining indices (RESI). In capturing the security prices movements, returns are 
adjusted for individual firms’ systematic risk (ie 𝑏𝑓𝑖 and 𝑏𝑟𝑖) using Van Rensburg’s (2002) two-
factor model. The computation of the abnormal security returns for each of the sample firms 
are as described as the formula: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝐸 (𝑅𝑖𝑡)|𝑅𝑚𝑡) 







▪ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the daily abnormal return of security i for the period t. 
▪ 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the return on firm i in period t.  
▪ ( (𝑅𝑖𝑡)| 𝑅𝑚𝑡) is the return on the relevant market index (FINDI or RESI) in period t. 
 
The model applied is as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 +  𝑡   
𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑎𝑖  + 𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼+ 𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼+ 𝑡   
 
∴ 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼 +  𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼 +  𝑡   
 
∴  (𝐸 (𝑅𝑖𝑡)|𝑅𝑚𝑡) =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼 + 𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼 + 𝑡 
Where: 
▪ (𝑏𝑓𝑖 and 𝑏𝑟𝑖), are the JSE FINDI and RESI indices, predictive factors. 
▪ 𝑎𝑖  is an intercept term with no special theoretical significance in the market model. 
▪ 𝑡  is a residual error or error term, approximately zero.  
Van Rensburg (2002) concludes that individual security returns are influenced by either one 
of the two factors but seldom by both. Refer to section 4.2 for steps taken to remove the 
noninfluential factor, ie eliminating the non-significant indices measured by insignificant t-
statistic outcome). 
 
4.4.4.1 Cross-sectional aggregation 
 
Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) warned of event-date clustering over is a serious challenge, even 
when cross-correlation among abnormal returns is relatively low, in terms of over-rejecting the 
null hypothesis of zero average abnormal returns when it is true. In this study cross-sectional 
correlation doesn’t arise for two reasons, namely, the sample firms' release or event dates are 
not on the same day and we employed Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Durbin Watson 
(DW) statistics (refer to 4.2). 
 
In testing for information efficiency (Beaver, et al., 2005)  the study determines whether the 
cross-sectional distribution of returns at the time of an event is systematically different from 
predicted (Kothari and Warner, 2007), ie abnormal. Therefore, for N number of securities in 
the sample, the cross-sectional mean abnormal return for any period t is (Kothari and Warner, 














Cata (2015) used t-statistic to test for the statistical significance of the average cross-sectional 
mean abnormal returns (ARs) under the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅 = 0: 
 





Kothari and Warner (2007) assessed the effects of the information contents on security returns 
to examine whether the mean cumulative abnormal returns for periods around the event equal 
to zero.   
 
4.4.4.2 Time-series aggregation - cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
 
In testing for the market efficiency, the study considers the initial market reaction to new and 
significant information content to predict the direction and duration together with the magnitude 
of CARs in the period subsequent to trading statement releases and earnings announcements. 
The examination of post-event return drift observation provides information on market 
efficiency. The abnormal performance average abnormal returns are added together to 











   is the average abnormal return for firm i at time t.  
▪ N is the number of securities or firms in the portfolio. 










Both the CAR and Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) methods test for the null 
hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅 = 0). Kornik (2005) and Murie (2014) registered the shortcomings in the 
CAR calculations of not taking into account the compounding effects, however, concluded that 
in the short run it is negligible. Under the null hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅 = 0) to test for statistical 











The identified research methodologies are used to determine or estimate the security 
abnormal returns, prior to or after unexpected earnings events. Firstly, it is to ascertain the 
benchmark or expected return using a simple expectation based on the sign of the releases 
and unexpected earnings measures to classify the ‘earnings surprise’ or unexpected earnings 
into good’ or ‘bad’ news portfolios. Secondly,  it is the observation of security price behaviour 
on and around the time of the event.  In an attempt to answer the research question on the 
effects of unexpected earnings on the price formation process, several hypotheses were 
developed for testing.  The event study measure or models are meant to gauge the 




 CHAPTER 5 
DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The study data consist of opening, daily intra-day and closing prices, unexpected cautionary 
and annual earnings announcements between January 2014 to March 2019 were obtained for 
a sample of firms listed on JSE.  Data times were carefully checked as some of the 
announcements take place prior, during and after market opening. The cautionary earnings 
data is a combination of compulsory paragraph 3.4(b)(i) to (viii) and voluntary paragraphs 8.35 
to 8.44 or 22.19 of the regulatory and statutory requirements to publish period financial 
disclosures (JSE Service Issue 14, 2011). In this section, the study presents data details and 
provides descriptive statistics to highlight some of the data’s salient features.  
 
5.2 DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION (Table 1: full sample) 
 
A much larger sample of 172 observations is used in this study that consists of 120 ‘good’ and 
52 ‘bad’ news portfolios. The trading statement releases were 223 between January 2014 and 
March 2019, however, reduced to 172 because certain dates were in conflict with the beta 
trailing window period or estimation period of 65 days. The data is collected from the SENS 
database on IRESS (ie McGregor BFA) concerning trading statement releases and earnings 
announcements for the study period of January 2014 to March 2019. 
 
The end of day (EOD) daily total return indices include both dividends and security price 
movement were obtained from individual share’s total return indices sourced from 
Datastream/Bloomberg. 
 
The criteria for the firms' sample selection were as follows: 
▪ The firms must be a constituent of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index; 
▪ The issuer must have published a trading statement in the period from January 2014 
to March 2019 (including voluntary trading statements);  
▪ The date of trading statement release and earnings announcement must be available 
on the SENS news service; and 
▪ The announcement date of year-end earnings is the earliest of the publication date of 





Table 1 (below) provides for descriptive statistics of the sample firms’ security returns. It 
consists of average returns (mean), standard deviation (StDev), minimum (Min), maximum 
(Max), and skewness (Skew) calculated for each of the 172 securities reported in Table 1. 
 








(%) Skew ICB Supersector Releases 




0.25270 Bank 2 
2 Anglo American Platinum Ltd 0.00050 0.02725 
-
0.08672 0.17919 0.53683 Basic resources 10 
3 AngloGold Ashanti 0.00028 0.02929 
-
0.15821 0.12121 0.19930 Basic resources 6 






3.49878 Health Care 8 




0.36703 Banks 10 




0.34213 Insurance 11 
7 Exxaro Resources 0.00005 0.02705 
-
0.12610 0.17210 0.16842 Basic resources 11 




0.23860 Banks 3 




0.12130 0.19673 0.49856 Basic resources 10 







Industrial Goods and 
Services 5 




0.20373 0.29725 0.32844 Basic resources 11 




0.22614 Paper 7 




1.24850 Retail 7 






1.28175 Telecommunications 9 
15 Naspers 0.00073 0.02129 
-
0.08577 0.10384 0.06615 Media 9 




0.19072 Banks 1 









0.08391 0.09529 0.19552 
Industrial Goods and 
Services 6 




0.04635 Banks 4 




















0.18845 Food retailers - wholesalers 1 




0.33311 Banks 3 






0.09932 Retail 2 
25 The Spar Group 0.00029 0.01546 
-
0.06446 0.08181 0.11067 Food retailers - wholesalers 2 






0.22672 Food retailers - wholesalers 6 






0.08282 Retail 1 






0.03989 Retail 7 




The performing securities are with the highest average returns of 0,00140 (Capitec), 0,00079 
(PSG Group),  0,00073 (Naspers), 0,00050 (Anglo American)  and 0,00041 (Mondi).  The least 
performing are with the lowest average returns of 0,00015 (Imperial), 0,00016 (Woolworths), 
0,00059 (Impala), 0,00064 (MTN) and -0,00075 (Aspen).  Similarly, the most securities to 
exhibit the highest volatility are 0,03615 (Kumba Iron Ore), 0.03212 (Impala Platinum 
Holdings), 0,02929 (AngloGold Ashanti), 0,02725 (Anglo American Platinum Ltd) and 0,02705 
(Exxaro Resources).  Furthermore, most of these securities have a negative skewness with 
only 8 have a positive skewness and this is an indication there were more negative extreme 
price movements than positive ones over the study period. 
 
 
5.3 STUDY DATA LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES  
 
In this study, a sample of 172 released cautionary announcements although almost greater 
than the combined 58 (Murie, 2014) and 128 (Cata, 2015) trading statement releases with a 
longer sample period still contain a relatively small sample. Certainly, the positive average 
return on 18 securities over the sample period is reflective of both the bearish and bullish 
market sentiments in contrast to Murie’s (2014) and Cata’s (2015) bullish trend. Although, a 
reasonably smaller bad news trading statement releases but almost equal to the combined 28 
(Murie, 2014) and 31 (Cata, 2015). The security price direction in 28 out of 52 event dates (ie 
down price movement) was associated with the sign of the bad news portfolios which explains 
the bearish and bullish market sentiments. 
 
In examining the security returns the observed days’ variation represents a wider short-term 
event view of pre and post-window periods. This provides for a new measurement of the 
market reaction but more so present an opportunity for future studies to either explore the 
same variation in this study but for a longer sample period starting from 2010 to date and /or 
consider the combination of window periods in (Murie, 2014), (Cata, 2015) and this study for 
an improved view.  
The limitations of this study are a lack of robustness because of smaller data in comparison 
to Kornik’s (2005) 270 observations from a longer sample period and a lack of balanced 
variation in voluntary versus compulsory releases warranting a separate analysis considering 
the former (ie voluntary) in future. The market response on voluntary management forecast 




Currently, there is an improved trading statement history or data considering periods from 
2010 to date and in-depth analysis of the information inside the releases which provide for 
interesting future studies in understanding the size and extent (drift) of the market reaction. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
 
In compiling this study, the researcher uses the primary data obtained from the market data 
portals using the identified firms' sample selection criteria. The sample of firms was 
qualitatively and quantitatively analysed for a better and in-depth understanding of the 
application of unexpected earnings measures or models and a portfolio classification. 
This data analysis is instrumental in forming an opinion on the JSE efficient markets model of 
semi-strong form market efficiency and for the examination of an investor reaction to 
unexpected event news. And, whether the initial reaction to unexpected earnings an investor 





EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The study's empirical results provide for an interesting observation which to a certain degree 
is contrary to the previously conducted studies on both the effects of trading statement 
releases and unexpected annual earnings on the JSE asset price/valuation and security 
return.  
It must be generally accepted that there are several intervening events throughout the market 
opening. Summarily referred to as micro and macro-economic variables or events of interest, 
relevant or prevailing to the study sampling period that could have contributed to the observed 
outcomes (Holman, 2018). Some were one-time events that could have given rise to a certain 
market attitude, for example, the time elapsed since the economic crisis, Nene-gate, 
corruption and rating agencies. The two most relevant studies of Murie (2014) and Cata (2015) 
covered a period predominantly bullish market sentiment. This further explains the observed 
magnitude of the initial response and the extent of the direction of firms’ unexpected price 
reactions classified according to the sign of the trading statement. 
The estimation of ARs has greatly influenced by the accuracy of the unexpected earnings 
model resulting from the selection of the trailing window period used to predict the estimation 
parameters. The investor’s continuous access and use of timely sources of information 
contribute to the extent and direction of price reaction. The investor information ecosystem 
allows for the security price adjustments to regular or continuous (re)production of market 
information that is materially similar to the information contained in unexpected earnings. Then 
the investor sentiments ought to be fully captured in the prevailing security price. This formed 
part of the justification of the strong argument of an alternative definition by Beaver (1968) that 
the new information must be sufficiently material to induce changes to optimal portfolio 
holdings by individual investors.  
The crux of this chapter is on whether the information contained in the unexpected earnings 
is gradually impounded into security prices rather than an instantaneously – a test of 







6.2 UNEXPECTED EARNINGS MEASURES OR MODEL ACCURACY 
 
6.2.1 Beta estimation 
 
The most accurate or ‘true’ beta estimation is adversely affected by the disturbances of high-
frequency security price data, herein referred to as the market microstructure noise, which 
estimates the parameters unstable. A market noise means a data anomaly implying 
unpredictability or greater individual firms’ systematic risk. It can be avoided through the price 
data collection at an efficient rate for analysis and a selection of the optimal time interval taken 
into account in the calculation of realized beta, ie beta trailing window period (Ryu, 2011). He 
further found that an appropriate sampling frequency and the trailing window period were 
empirically found to be as short as 1 minute and as long as 1 week.  The market microstructure 
noise is mitigated by the underlying beta time-varying factor selection of 65 days trailing 
window period and high liquidity reduces noise level. It then strengthens the outcome of the 
return generating process. 
This study selected 65 days (13 weeks) when compared to Murie’s (2014) 60 days (12 weeks), 
Afego (2013) and Cata’s (2015) 100 days (20 weeks) beta trailing window period. This study 
and Cata’s (2015) market return proxy is beta-adjusted which is in contrast to Kornik (2005) 
and Murie (2014) because they found betas to be too unstable, thereon, assumed a beta of 
one. 
 
6.2.2 Estimation of parameters 
 
The literature argues that the market return or optimal portfolio/individual securities fluctuates 
because of unstable estimates which affect the income-generating process (ie model 
outcome). Perhaps the correct selection of the sampling period can normalise the 
unpredictable nature of the parameters to effectively capture the extent of the spontaneous 
nature of the investor behaviour as reflected in the price reaction. The continuous information 
access and consumption develop into an investor appetite and /or attitude to be reflected in 
the security price movements during the selected estimation period. The shortened estimation 
period of 65 days is expected to capture the recent market sentiments and improves beta 
estimation accuracy. The assumption must be that the consumption patterns reflect the 
investor sentiments which is a continuous effort of active institutional or collective investors to 





6.3 THE IMMEDIATE REACTION TO TRADING STATEMENT RELEASES 
 
6.3.1 Market reaction to and in anticipation of unexpected earnings releases 
 
The researcher examines any significant reactions 5 days before the unexpected earnings 
release date to observe security price movements in the direction of the news. The 
presumption is that the unexpected earnings news is unanticipated and the content therein 
could not have imagined or was unforeseeable by the market participants. The test attempts 
to ascertain if any information leakage or just a simply legitimate information dissemination. 
The sampled firms are grouped into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ new portfolios according to the 
information which we wish to observe being impounded into the security prices. The API for 
sampled firms' portfolio is calculated by averaging the APIs of the companies which are 
included in the portfolio. 
 
The API statistic captures any information leakage or legitimate information dissemination 
from period -k to period -1, the effect of the release at period 0 and post-release drift, ie from 
period 1 to period p, when the market is trying to digest the information. The formula originally 
adapted from Ball and Brown, 1968 and Skerratt (2002) as follows 
𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑  𝑇 ⋅  
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Table 2: The API spreadsheet calculations for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolio 
Good News Portfolio 
 




D Period  Sj equity return Market return Average AR API Good Formula 
12 5 P  0.28606 0.32862 -0.04256 1.00388 (1+D12)* D11 
11 4   -0.10612 0.16135 -0.26747 1.00436 (1+D11)* D10 
10 3   0.01040 -0.03326 0.04367 1.00672 (1+D10)* D9 
9 2   0.27964 0.27452 0.00512 1.00643 (1+D9)* D8 
8 1   -0.13883 0.15751 -0.29634 1.00652 (1+D8)* D7 
7 0 0 0.92737 0.08930 0.83807 1.00906 (1+D7)* D6 
6 -1   0.10340 0.03814 0.06526 1.00214 (1+D6)* D5 
5 -2   0.48704 0.15277 0.33427 1.00165 (1+D5)* D4 
4 -3   0.12498 0.20220 -0.07722 0.99896 (1+D4)* D3 
3 -4   0.35496 0.27973 0.07523 0.99961 (1+D3)* D2 
2 -5   -0.24853 -0.12855 -0.11998 0.99900 1+D2 
1   -k       1.00000 1.00000 
 
Bad News Portfolio  
 




D Period  Sj equity return Market return Average AR API Bad Formula 
12 5 P  0.14576 0.11371 0.03205 0.99015 (1+D12)* D11 
11 4   -0.09292 -0.00390 -0.08661 0.99087 (1+D11)* D10 
10 3   -0.00307 -0.02595 0.02288 0.99275 (1+D10)* D9 
9 2   0.00681 0.22852 -0.22171 0.99246 (1+D9)* D8 
8 1   0.07249 0.10859 -0.03610 0.99636 (1+D8)* D7 
7 0 0 -0.54690 -0.14248 -0.40442 0.99593 (1+D7)* D6 
6 -1   0.21909 0.20866 0.01043 1.00313 (1+D6)* D5 
5 -2   0.31735 0.10272 0.21463 1.00295 (1+D5)* D4 
4 -3   -0.24903 -0.10410 -0.14493 0.99877 (1+D4)* D3 
3 -4   -0.16378 -0.11269 -0.05109 1.00156 (1+D3)* D2 
2 -5   0.26812 0.13008 0.13803 1.00265 1+D2 
1   -k       1.00000 1.00000 
 
Table 2 and Figure 2 suggest the market has either anticipated or there was information 
leakage of private information on the ‘good’ news portfolio of sampled firms two days prior to 
release. However, for a ‘bad’ news portfolio it appears the market signal substantially updates 








6.3.2 Security price news releases and direction movement 
 
Kornik (2005) in rationalising the impact of earnings on the security price in the context of 
using future cash flows to measure the security intrinsic value when pointing out that in the 
short interval the differences are noticeable.  And that in the short-run earnings are inevitably 
an imperfect measure of value to the investor because the information content is very 
uncertain (Kornik, 2005). The thing is, what gives value to any information is knowing that it 
exists and accurate. Please check the previous sentence The information relevance gets its 
impetus from how the market resolves to use it, either to confirm what is already known or 
used to predict what is likely to happen next in the context of other sources of information.  
There will always be a strong link between current and future earnings, and current and future 
cash flows, therefore, it will always be very relevant and useful in assessing the security value. 
The summary results are as follows, the mean (average) return on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news are  
0.96483 and -0.58796 with ARs of 0.90716 and -0.47351, respectively. The total return is 
0.38407 and CARs of 0.43365, therefore, all sampled firms' security prices are positively 
skewed in line with the trading statement news signs. The rationale of the market information 
efficiency is that there no ARs earned in the market on the release of earnings news. This 
suggests that these initial market responses to unexpected earnings are inconsistent with 
semi-strong form market efficiency. 
 
A further breakdown analysis reveals that in 102 event dates based on upward price 
movement, a total of 78 ‘good’ (24 ‘bad’) news portfolios resulted in total returns of 1.82802 (-
0.44942), model expected returns of 0.16633 (0.00696) and abnormal return of 1.66169 
(0.45638).  Whereas on the other 70 event dates based on a downward price movement, a 
total of 42 ‘good’ and (28 bad) news portfolios resulted in a total return of -0.85959 (-1.03737), 
model expected returns of -0.10506 (0.10748) and abnormal return: -0.75453 (-0.92989).   
In summary, the presented simple arithmetic results provide for the effects of the new 
information (ie a sign of unexpected earnings / ‘earnings surprises’) in trading statement 
releases and the associated sign of abnormal returns. The security price direction in 106 event 
dates (ie 78 up and 28 down price movement) was associated with the sign of the news. The 
total security returns sign (+-) in 106 (62%) of the 172 event dates were in line with the sign of 
unexpected earnings / ‘earnings surprises’ in support of the overall news price direction.  
Whereas, the total security returns sign (+-) in 66 out the 172 event dates (38%) observed the 




Under section 3.6 (above) the study considers other possible situations or factors that might 
have caused the security price to move opposite the news sign such as trading halts, 
commodity circle, general retailers sub-index, and analyst forecast publications are discussed. 
The investors’ consideration of such other factors may have contributed to the 66 instances 
or event dates (38%) occurrences. This might be a strong indication of the investor 
consideration of a combination of micro and macro-economic factors in decision making. The 
investor access to these different information systems or platforms and consistent use of the 
generated information captures the short and long-term view of the arrived at a decision.  
Table 3: the sign of unexpected earnings is positively correlated with the sign of abnormal security returns 
 
Trading Statement - portfolio sign 
Abnormal Returns 
AR (+ve) AR (-ve) Totals News 
Good news 69 (40%) 51 (30%) 120 (70%) 
Bad news 23 (13%) 29 (17%) 52 (30%) 
Total AR sign 92 (53%) 74 (47%) 172 (100%) 
 
In a total of 98 (57%) event dates the sign of trading statements was associated with the sign 
of ARs. Whereas, in 74 (43%) event dates the opposite is true. The predictive information 
derived here is that there is an almost 50/50 chance that news and ARs signs are the same. 
Although Cata (2015) cautioned on the interpretation of the hypothesized association to 
emphasize the fact that this hypothesis is agnostic on the causal link between trading 
statements and share returns. The evidence suggests it is not certain that an (a) investor (fund 
manager) can use the initial reaction to trading statement releases to predict the sign of 
abnormal return on the release date. After ascertaining, on the release date, that an AR is 
generated with almost 50% prediction certainty of the sign, therefore, the direction of AR. This 
finding is critical in how we interpret the research results together with the observed model 
accuracy evidenced by almost zero average abnormal returns of 0.00252. However, the size 
of unexpected earnings is positively correlated with the magnitude of cumulative abnormal 










6.3.3 The effects of unexpected earnings on security prices  
 
The outcome of this event study confirms not only the relativeness of the JSE market efficiency 
to other emerging markets but also the length of time it takes for the price adjustment process 
to complete. 
In making inferences about the market efficiency Fama (1991) points to the main obstacles of 
the seriousness of the joint-hypothesis problem. This is the market efficiency, it can only be 
tested with some model of equilibrium such as the asset-pricing model (Fama, 1991). He 
further states that to test whether the information is properly reflected in security prices can 
only be conducted in the context of a pricing model that defines the meaning of "properly". 
Since security prices adjust to various sources of information it therefore prudent to adopt a 
model that addresses the extent of the reasonableness of the new information in the context 
of the JSE market.  
This study adopted a two-factor model (Van Rensburg, 2002) to immediately measure whether 
the market sentiments of the sizeable investors are fully reflected in the security price. A five-
step process in section 4.2 was followed to eliminate the correlation between the two predictive 
variables. In ascertaining if any information is lost or left behind the modeling process requiring 
the study uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to test for the quality of statistics. It 
examines the extent of the reasonableness or sensitivity of the information contained in the 
trading statements which the market had synthesized into share prices. 
 
The study can reasonably conclude that security price adjustment incorporates various kinds 
of information (Fama, 1991) as evidenced by the price reaction contrary to the trading 
statement news sign. Section 6.3.1 indicates that in 66 out of a total sample of 172 events the 
price movement contradicted the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news sign. Although, the focus of the study 
is not to identify the effect of various kinds of information on the trading statement releases, 
however, the reaction contrary to news sign indicates a strong presence of investor 
consideration of other forms of information that may include a combination of micro and macro-
economic factors. This supports Fama’s (1991) view of a weaker and economical more 
sensible version of market efficiency where prices reflect information to the point where the 
profits made of acting on information exceeds the information and transaction costs (Jensen, 
1998). 
Cata (2015) stated that “the new information should, therefore, lead to a reassessment of 
individuals’ beliefs and expectations of the likelihood of alternative outcomes.”  Also, Beaver 




expectation to be reflected in the changes to equilibrium prices. The new information must be 
sufficiently material when compared to the existing other various kinds of information from 
other timelier sources of information. 
When considering the above definition and Murie’s (2014) finding the trading statement 
releases do not entirely contain unexpectedly new and material information. In other words, 
the publication is in addition to a circle of continuous production of new information that affirms 
(strengthen) or contradicts (weakens) the functioning of the existing various kinds of 
information. There will always be continuous contributions to the information ecosystem 
through new corrective and additive market information The assumption is that the effect is 
from the continuous consumption of new kinds of market news by a collection of active 
individuals and /or institutional investors. Hence, the materiality factor leads to a reassessment 
of beliefs and expectations with such changes reflected in security prices.  
 
6.3.4 The association between trading statement release and security returns 
 
The study adopted a Model 3 market association criterion on the security return estimation in 
measuring short-run market reaction to the earnings announcement (Foster et al.,1984). The 
market association criterion uses security price movement in identifying information transfers 
associated with earnings releases to capture the security return. The results give an effect in 
answering a question on whether trading statement releases contain new and sufficiently 
material information to induce changes to investors’ optimal portfolio holdings (Beaver, 1968). 
Refer to section 6.3.1 and Table 3 (above) in measuring the sign and magnitude of the 
‘earnings surprise’ together with the associated sign and magnitude of abnormal returns. 
Below are statistical answers where it is expected that a greater number of t-values fall within 
the expected t-values, that is, closer to 0 or less and /or greater than the critical values (left or 
right tail). The rejection region indicates that the t-statistic values within the acceptance region 
and p-values are greater than alpha (p>0.05).    
The study found statistically significant abnormal returns (ARs) associated with trading 
unexpected earnings or ‘surprise earnings’ providing the required evidence that trading 
statements contain new and sufficient materially information, in the period surrounding the 
releases. The hypothesis tested is as follows: 
▪ 𝐻0: (𝐴𝑅0| trading statements) = 0 




The observed days’ variation captures the pre- and post-event short-run market reaction to 
release to unexpected earnings news. The computed daily ARs consist of a combination of 
four variations representing window periods, namely [-2, 0], [0, 2] and [-2, 2] and [3, +5]. The 
use of daily data is meant to isolate other market events such as analyst earnings estimate 
publication, commodity price circle, retail sales announcement and halted stock in anticipation 
of other sensitive information (ie other pending announcement or corporate event). These 
events from other macroeconomic and /or firm-specific announcements are price-sensitive 
and occur throughout the year.  
In testing for the effects of the information content of releases and to improve the 
informativeness of the analysis the average cross-sectional abnormal returns used 
aggregates across the N announcements and were certainly different from zero but are not 
























∴  𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑𝟑𝟔𝟓 
Theoretically, the expected average abnormal returns of security are zero. The ascertained 
results are not significantly different from zero on the release date, however, under the null 
hypothesis 𝐻0: (AR0| trading statements) = 0.  Although not significantly different from zero the 
trading statements releases contain new and sufficient materially information. The prediction 
is that the new information contained in the news releases, however, insignificant will not be 
quickly reflected in the security prices, thus leaving room for statistically significant ARs 
generated on acting on the unexpected earnings or surprise earnings. This is against the 
rationale of the semi-strong form market efficiency where there are no ARs earned in the 
market on the release of earnings news. 
 






∴  𝒕𝑨𝑹 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟓𝟒𝟔𝟒 
 











Furthermore, the t-statistic values of the cross-sectional and time-series aggregation abnormal 
returns (ie n – no. of firms) are statistical not significant, however, under the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: (AR0) / (CAR0) = 0.  The calculations are determined as follows: 
⎯
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 0.00252, (𝐴𝑅𝑡) 
= 0.03721 and √28 (number of sampled firms) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 0.43365, (𝐴𝑅𝑡) = 2.89399 and 
√28. A test of mean ARs and CARs against zero resulted in a total sample of 𝑡𝐴𝑅 = 0.35464 
and  𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 0.70290  different from zero. Kornik’s (2005) initial argument was that ARs should 
rather be tested against the percentage of  𝑡𝐴𝑅 = 0.35464  and   𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 0.79290 as in this study 
results instead of the expected zero AR. Although he concedes that this view is statistically 
incorrect, this argument presumes that the total sample ARs must be zero. This view cannot 
be possible where the total sampled firms' security price movement is positively skewed in line 
with the trading statement news sign. The hypothesis 𝐻0: (AR0) = 0 is rejected although the 
results do not appear to be materially different from the total sample expected zero AR.  It is 
explained further below.  
 
Table 4 below is the result of a two-factor unexpected earnings model with a mean ARs and 
CARs and t-statistics for the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios over the window period of [-5, 
+5]. The average abnormal returns (ARs) differ from the target mean of zero except where 
marked with an asterisk. It is conspicuously clear that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios are 
inclined to have positive and negative average ARs over observed variations in days [-5, +5]. 
Whereas, ‘good’ (‘bad’) news portfolios overwhelmingly show a positive and negative average 
CAR post-release over the observed variations in days [-5, +5].  
However, there is a noticeable observation of a less significant magnitude of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) in the periods prior and after trading statement releases. This 
perhaps could have been well as a result of the model accuracy referred to in section 6.2 
(above). The accuracy of the parameters was a result of a shortened estimation period of 65 
days capturing the recent market sentiments as reflected in the data this improved the beta 
estimation accuracy.   
The selected methodology and the application (refer to chapter 4, notable 4.2) thereon 
surgically removed the market microstructure noise stemming from high-frequency stock price 
data. The intraday observations (ie prices) where a potential for high-frequency price data is 
likely were only selected for releases after 9:15 but before 16:45. The discreteness of security 
prices or intra-day price volatility can cause estimation of some parameters (e.g. realized 

























-5 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.5359 0.0027 0.0027 0.3614 [-5, 0]  
-4 0.0006 *-0.0004 0.9939 -0.0010 0.0017 -0.4236   
-3 *-0.0006 -0.0010 0.6676 -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.3306   
-2 0.0028 0.0018 0.5596 0.0041 0.0030 0.4679 [-2, 0]  
-1 *0.0005 0.0023 0.1465 *0.0002 0.0032 0.9795   
0 0.0070 0.0093 0.1924 -0.0078 -0.0046 -0.2781 [0, 0]  
1 -0.0025 0.0068 0.5635 *-0.0007 -0.0053 0.2812   
2 *0.0000 0.0069 **1.0375 -0.0043 -0.0095 0.7578 [0, 2]  
3 *0.0004 0.0072 -0.1283 0.0004 -0.0091 -0.0490   
4 -0.0022 0.0050 0.4177 -0.0017 -0.0107 -0.0193   
5 *-0.0004 0.0047 0.9843 *0.0006 -0.0101 0.2839 [0, 5]  
* Almost zero average ARs. ** Statistically (not very) significant  
 
The results on the above table provide a compelling argument that other timely sources of 
information have already been factored into security prices before unexpected earnings 
releases outside the observed window period of [-5; +5].  Although the study focuses on the 
short term the evidence in the magnitude of the average CARs and non-significant t-statistics 
suggest investor uses other timelier sources of information.  
The argument that the market already impounded other timelier sources of information into 
the security price can only be evidenced to the extent of the observed size of the mean ARs 
before and after trading statement releases. The absence of potential profiting on and after 
the release date suggests that the market utilizes other timelier sources of information 
available in the market to revise security valuations (Murie, 2014). Information contained in 
trading statements is not ‘completely’ but partly new, however, sufficiently material to the 
extent it leads to a reassessment of individuals’ beliefs and expectations The study agrees 
with Murie’s (2014) view that information contained in the trading statements may not be 
‘completely’ new, therefore, not entirely a timely source of information. 
We argued that the multi factor-model as identified by Dr. Holman (2018) provides us with not 
only the explanatory power of why about 85 to 90 percent of market information is impounded 
into the security prices pre-event date but provide for an opportunity to improve on the true 
return generating process (Van Rensburg, 2002). This should tell the reader that the security 
fairly prices to the extent of the absent completely new market information. But most 




often) strongly accompanied at best by the quality of information captured through these multi-
factors. 
 
6.3.5 Post releases but preceding the actual earnings announcement 
 
In figure 3 (below) is the results of the investigation into the post-trading statement releases 
drift anomaly through the examination of the sign of unexpected earnings or ‘earnings surprise’ 
and, the sign and size of the mean ARs.  From figure 3 a post-trading statement release drift 
anomaly is observable together with a correlation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios 
and, sign and size of the mean ARs. 
In this study on average, the releases followed earnings announcement by 15.6 days when 
excluding outliers increased to 17.5 days inclusive of all days, however, Murie, (2014) is 9 
days and (Cata, 2015) is 13 days. The study focuses on a short-term window period of [-5; +5] 
and the study unexpected earnings model or measures of [-2; +2] period. The study 
presupposition is that since these events are independent of each other the knowledge of the 
occurrence of the earlier is unlikely to influence the outcome of the latter.  
In figure 3 below, drift post drift of [1; +5] flattens out, this could sustain the argument by Murie 
(2014) that investors adjust their expectations to the level of the news and thereon wait out for 
the confirmation of the occurrence later event, ie earnings announcement. The argument here 
and in previous studies is that post-release drift violates the efficient market theory is 
sustained.  
However, the researcher goes further to say, immediately, after investors applied their minds 
to the new and sufficiently material information immediately adjust their expectations (ie re-
affirm, accept or reject their market perspectives) to the ‘new’ sentiments. This adjusted or 
new or aligned market information or sentiments as measured by the magnitude and /or extent 
(drift) of investor reaction or lack thereof is just another occurrence in the information cycle 
now reflected in the security prices. A window period of [-5; +5] is enough to observe a 
complete market reaction cycle to the news, thereon, security price reflective of the ‘new’ 
market sentiments.  
Had the price movement converged towards zero average ARs immediately after, say [1; +5] 
days variation could have meant that either the investor correction of the initial reaction has 
taken place soon enough or other new information emerged or other ‘priced’ factors began to 




There is an unusual spike on the -3 day on the ‘good’ news portfolio just before the trading 
statement released while the ‘bad’ news portfolio begins to flatten on -2 day eventually plunges 
on -1 day, whereas, ‘good’ news spoke even further. The investors’ reaction two days 
preceding the trading statement release could suggest information leakage of material and 
non-public information (Kornik, 2005 and Cata, 2015). On day zero ‘good’ news is at its highest 
points and beyond that point, on average, flattens out, however, ‘bad’ news drift downwards 
and began to flatten on day 4. This downward drift explains the negative effect of ‘bad’ news.  




The efficient market hypothesis suggests that price-sensitive information is instantaneously 
impounded into the security price. The security prices immediately adjust to the extent of 
completely new market price-sensitive information according to semi-strong form market 
efficiency. This is evidenced when no statistically significant mean ARs,  CARs and no post-
earnings drifts (ie CARs) or if any post CARs must be random.   
The observation of a post-release security price drift, referred to as post-earnings drift, 
contradicts the market efficiency theory. Although the outcome of the mean ARs and CARs 
are not statistically significant, however, violates the null hypothesis 𝐻0: (AR0) = 0, therefore, 
the study rejects the presumption of nil ARs. Again, this must suggest that, firstly, releases 
contain partly new and to such extent the timely source of information, and that investors use 
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This creates a situation where strategies can be devised in and around news publications and 
a decision taken based on the information and transaction costs. The opportunity to devise a 
trading strategy on releases must be contrary to the assertion of the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
Table 5 (below) the asterisks represent statistical significance at the 5% level (two-tailed) of 
significance. The deciles are formed based on an unexpected earnings model or measures. 
The study used Model 3 of the market association criterion for the security return estimation 
(Foster et al. 1984).   
Table 5: Earnings anomalies: post-announcement security price drift 
Table 5 
Cumulative Average Residuals for Forecast Error Portfolios: Days [-2] to [+2] in four variations 












Model (most positive) 10 *5.55 *4.03 *3.44 *3.48 *3.59 
  
9 *3.42 *2.55 1.66 1.74 *2.24 
8 1.74 1.17 0.89 0.70 1.32 
7 0.71 0.70 0.64 0.53 0.38 
6 0.12 0.29 -0.12 -0.20 -0.06 
5 -0.11 -0.48 -0.31 0.21 0.06 
4 -0.50 -0.06 0.22 0.60 -0.05 
3 -1.13 -0.05 0.06 -0.94 -1.31 
2 *-2.31 -1.33 -1.09 -1.28 *-2.11 
Model (most negative) 1 *-4.85 *-3.79 *-3.42 *-3.56 *-4.16 
Source: Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) 
The table above divided the observations into 10 different deciles in a descending order based 
on the size of unexpected earnings from most positive to negative. The tenth decile consists 
of 10 firms, namely TBS, ABG, AMS, APN, CPI, KIO, MNP, PSG, SLM and SOL. These firms 
belong to the ICB super-sector that ranges from Banks, Basic resources, Health care, Paper, 
Financial Services, Insurance, Oil and Gas to Food retailers. The ninth and eighth decile 
consists of 22 and 18 firms out of 28, respectively.  
An investor can devise a long and short trading strategy based on the 10 and 9, and 2 and 1 
deciles over the five trading days in and around the release date. The model 3 drift evidenced 
in table 5 (above) for mentioned deciles is in stark contrast to Kornik’s (2005) findings, thereon, 
view that the return based unexpected earnings measures (ie models 3 and 4) may be 
inaccurate. He correctly pointed out that the security returns based on unexpected earnings 
measures are expected to provide for a reliable indication of the market’s true earnings 




since no observed models 3 and 4 drift was that the outcome suggests that the market is 
efficient and that models 3 and 4 are a true measure, although, a drift was expected. 
Kornik (2005) mentioned other arguments that may favor the market efficient proposition, 
namely: inadequate models used to estimate ARs and unexpected earnings, used CAPM beta 
and that observations are time-period specific. These arguments are completely rejected 
insofar as the pool of studies conducted not only in recent times and to date in the context of 
JSE.  
It could be argued that there must be some complexes to the matter than just mere differences 
in unexpected earnings models or measures adopted because the information is generated 
within the context of a universe of many other attributable priced sensitive factors as 
mentioned in Dr. Glen Holman’s (2018) 10 multi factor-model in the context of SA. At this 
moment you could strongly argue that certain security ‘priced’ sensitive factors are better 
captured by certain types of differently adjusted models.  
 
6.3.5 The association between the sign of unexpected earnings and abnormal 
returns 
 
The sign of unexpected earnings or ‘earnings surprises is based on the hypothesized causal 
link between the sign of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios based on the sign of trading 
statements content and the consequent sign of abnormal returns (Cata, 2015). In Figure 3 
(above), the pre and post-releases depict not the effect of the new and sufficiently material 
information on the security price but the direction of the movement (ie upwards or downwards) 
against the sign of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ new portfolios. Figure 3 (above) depicts at least in the 
short run the investors appear to have adjusted their expectations to the partly new and other 
timelier information as appears to maintain its dominance over other priced multi factors as 
shown by the drift anomaly. 
The study further investigates the pre-release period using the Abnormal Performance Index 
(API) to understand the reaction, in the direction of the news, of security prices in the short 
run. The pattern of pre-releases reaction in figure 3 cannot be a confirmation of the investors’ 
use of other timelier sources of information to inform their investment decision making but a 
reaction in anticipation of what is likely to happen next (i.e. day zero). Throughout the study 
observation of the security price movement in [-3; -1] days may suggest the inclusion of the 
new information which will affect the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal return in the short 




The tables below (table 6; 6.1 and 6.2) provide for exploratory analysis of the relationship 
between the sign of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios and CARs over the [1; 2] and [3; +5] 
periods after trading statement releases. The degree of association is measured by a 
combination of chi-square, albeit not a powerful test, hence a one and two tail t statistic tests 
with varying outcomes. The hypothesis tested is as follows: 
▪ 𝐻0: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and CAR) = 0 - the sign of trading statement releases  
and the sign of CARs are independent 
▪ H1: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and CAR) ≠ 0 - the sign of trading statement releases  
are associated with the sign of CARs 
Tables 6 and 6.1 chi-square statistic calculations marked with * indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no association cannot be rejected at the 0.05% level of significance.  However, 
when marked with ** provide evidence (in bold) of a statistically significant relationship 
between the sign of unexpected annual earnings classified according to trading statement 
releases and CARS. The results of a p-value of 1, as indicated with *, suggests that the results 
are not significant at p < .05. Where the p-value is .00001 marked with two asterisks (**) shows 
no uniform variance at p-value > 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis of no association. The 
results show no relationship between the sign of unexpected annual earnings and the average 
AR over the day variation of [1; +2] for bad and [3 to +5] for good news post-release period. 
Table 6.1 window periods of [1 to 2] for ‘good’ and [3 to 5] for ‘bad’ news portfolio, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for reasons as indicated in table 6.  
 
In summarizing the results in tables 6 and 6.1 suggest in the short run for ‘good’ news portfolio 
in window period [1 to +2] the markets welcome good news but quickly lose momentum as 
demonstrated in [3 to +5]. The opposite is very true for the ‘bad’ news portfolio. The market is 
neither pessimistic nor optimistic which is rather very curious noting previous studies. The 
view is in contrast to Knight’s (1983) and Kornik’s (2005) findings of asymmetric reaction in 
favor of good news hence concluded that the market is pessimistic in its earnings 
expectations. However, as indicated in previous studies chi-square test is not a powerful test, 








Table 6: Test of association between the sign of unexpected earnings and CARs (Ball and Brown, 1968) 
summary 
Chi-Square Test Result (APA) – Good and Bad News ARs 
Trading Days Observation X Squared Test P-Value 
5 172 44.19 *1.00000 
4 172 -5.18 **.00001 
3 172 10.00 *1.00000 
2 172 -6.91 **.00001 
1 172 7.12 *1.00000 
0 172 -24.38 **.00001 
-1 172 -3.99 **.00001 
-2 172 15.20 *1.00000 
-3 172 -2.01 **.00001 
-4 172 5.88 *1.00000 
-5 172 -1.26 **.00001 
Table 6.1: The association of ‘good’ and ‘bad news and CARS sign  
Chi-Square Test Result (APA) - CARs 
Trading Days News Observations x
2 stat  P-Value (<0,05) 
1 to 2 Good 239 -10.628 **.00001 
1 to 2 Bad 103 10.841 *1.00000 
3 to 5 Good 359 65.835 *1.00000 
3 to 5 Bad 155 -16.823 **.00001 
*The P-Value is 1. The result is not significant at p < .05. 
**The P-Value is < .00001. The result is significant at p < .05. 
 












T-test summary (1 to 2) 
‘Good’/ ‘bad’ news portfolio Good Bad 
Average CAR (1;2) -0.0012 -0.0025 
Observations 103 239 
t-stat 0.492 0.296 
t Critical one-tail 1.651 1.660 
p-value < 0.05 = Reject (No) 0.311 0.384 
t-stat 1.124 0.728 
t Critical two-tail 1.965 1.972 
p-value < 0.05 = Reject (No) 0.262 0.468 
   
T-test summary (3 to 5) 
‘Good’/ ‘bad’ news portfolio Good Bad 
Average CAR (3;5) -0.00074 -0.0002 
Observations 359 155 
t-stat 0.4558 0.0895 
t Critical one-tail 1.6491 1.6548 
p-value < 0.05 = Reject (No) 0.3244 0.4644 
t-stat 0.797 0.118 
t Critical two-tail 1.963 1.968 




Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios are based on observation within the 
days’ variation of [1 to 2] and [3 to 5]. Table 6.2 results show that the null hypothesis of no 
association classified according to the sign of the trading statement and the CARs cannot be 
rejected at the 5% significance level. The t-test in table 6.2 here and table 3 chi-squared results 
of Cata’s (2014) found no evidence of a relationship between the sign of news and CARs post-
release period on  [2 to 5] window period. In this study, however, the presentation of the chi-
squared results in table 6.1 is different from Cata’s table 3  as it splits ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news 
portfolios and with days’ variation of [1 to 2] and [3 to 5].  
Murie’s (2014) t-test conducted based on days variation of [-2 to 1] and [0 to 1] gave mixed 
results with CARs significantly greater than zero for ‘good’ news portfolio, however, the 
opposite is true for ‘bad’ news portfolio. The summation of this study’s t-test results is that both 
‘good’ news and ‘bad’ news portfolios the CARs were not significantly greater or less than zero 
as expected.  
In conclusion, the initial market responses to ‘earnings surprises’ cannot be used to predict 
the future sign of abnormal returns irrespective of mixed outcomes. However, the evidence is 
not enough to suggest that this phenomenon is completely inconsistent with semi-strong form 
market efficiency and the study focus is short term of [2 to 5] window period as opposite to 
Cata’s (2015) of [2, 15]. Murie found a strong and negligible correlation over the (3;+60) for 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ post-release, respectively. The biggest differentiator of these studies is the 
use of different market proxies with Kornik (2005), Zheng (2007) and Murie (2014) presumed 
a beta of one whereas Cata (2014) and in this study used beta-adjusted for systemic risk to 
measure abnormal returns. Some of Murie’s (2014) assertions of phenomena of survivorship 
bias of sample firms, a bullish market over the 2010 to 2013 period and the effect of JSE’s 
Top 60 small market capitalization cannot be sustained based on the study results. 
 
6.3.6 The magnitude of firms’ unexpected earnings and the abnormal security 
returns 
 
The rationale here is that trading statements contain new and sufficient material information 
causing the investor to react in seeking to integrate this information into security price. The 
expectation is that the greater the ‘earnings surprise’ the larger the security price movement 
in and around releases date. The association of the magnitude of firms’ share price reaction 
to unexpected earnings measures and the size of abnormal security returns is investigated. 
The methods applied are table 6 (above) grouping of the total sample of observations into 




𝑦𝑖  =   +  𝑏𝑥𝑖  +  𝑖 
Where: 
▪ 𝑦𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return over the period surrounding the trading statement 
announcement.  
▪ 𝑥𝑖 is the expected earnings measures as defined in section 4.4.3. 
▪ b is a coefficient measuring the sensitivity of 𝑦𝑖 to 𝑥𝑖. 
 
The hypothesis tested is as follows:  
▪ 𝐻0: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and CAR) = 0 
▪ H1: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and CAR) ≠ 0 
 No or a positive relationship exists between the magnitude of the unexpected earnings 
measures and CARs in the post-release period. 
Table 7: The relationship between the magnitude of firms’ unexpected earnings measures and size of 
abnormal security returns 
 
Table 8: The relationship between the magnitude of firms’ unexpected returns and abnormal security 
returns 
 
Table 7 represents the summary results of the relationship between the firms’ unexpected 
earnings measures and CARs. The slope coefficients marked with an asterisk (*) reveal highly 
Unexpected earnings 
measures 
Model [-2, 2] Model [-2, 0] Model [-1, 0] Model [0, 1] Model [0, 2] 
Slope coefficient  0.0725 *0.1147 0.0281 -0.0435 *-0.1781 
T-stat 0.4460 0.9478 0.2657 -0.3800 -1.2536 
P-value 0.6562 0.3446 0.7908 0.7045 0.2117 
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 
Days variation (-1; 0) Days (-1; 1) Days (0; 1) Days (-2; 2) Days (1; 2) Days (3; 5) Days 
Slope coefficient  0.0006 0.0009 0.0006 *0.0014 *0.0022 0.0010 
T-stat 0.924 *1.660 0.981 *3.506 *3.533 *1.789 
P-value 0.3563 0.0974 0.3273 *0.0005 *0.0005 0.0742 




significant unexpected earnings of greater than zero. Therefore, the slope coefficients are 
statistically significant for Models [-2, 0] and [0, 2]. While other slope coefficients are significant 
and greater than zero. This implies the null hypothesis of no relationship between the 
magnitude of unexpected earnings and CARs cannot be rejected, more so, for Models [-2, 0] 
and [0, 2]. The results on the unexpected earnings measures are in contrast with’s Cata (2014) 
findings insofar as Models [-2, 0] and [0, 2]. However, the study outcomes of the Models [-2, 
0] and [0, 2] are in line with Murie’s (2014) findings, albeit, on trading days of [-2, 1]. Table 8 
for [-2; +2] and [+1; +2] days variation confirms a positive relationship exists between the 
magnitude of the unexpected earnings measures and CARs in the post-release period.  
 
6.3.7 The post-trading statement announcement drift 
 
In responding to a question of any sustained association rational momentum effects of market 
reaction post-trading statement releases preceding earnings announcements. In section 6.3.3 
figure 3 a post-trading statement release drift anomaly is observable together with a correlation 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios and, sign and size of the mean ARs. Figure 3 
observed short term [1; +5] flat CARs drift pattern is in line with Murie’s (2014) [3; +60] window 
period but the mean ARs size insignificant. A closer look at Marie’s (2014) figure 8 ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ news portfolios for window period [2; +7] shows no drift and CARs are in opposite 
direction to the news. This raises questions on the sudden drift in figure 8 (Murie, 2014) from 
window period [8;+60] related to the news of the release market reaction or could it be that 
other prices sensitive market factors are introduced in line with the release news direction to 
resuscitated the initial market reaction. However, the contrary is true, refer to Kornik’s (2005) 
finding in figure 14 when an immediate reaction is observed in the direction of the new only 
within the [1; +5] window period. 
As is confirmed in figure 3 (above) for days variation of [1; +5] there is a predictable but 
statistically insignificant CARs drift post-release and is correlated with the sign of the news.  
This observation confirms Cata’s (2015) findings that CARs for all the good and bad news 
portfolios are not statistically significant over the various holding periods. 
As previously argued that the reason for almost zero average ARs can be attributed to the 
accuracy of estimation parameters (ie the intercept and slope coefficients). The lack of market 
response/activities after the release date maybe as a result of the investor access to other 
timely sources of information, for example waiting to confirm the ‘earnings surprise’ release 
via the actual earnings announcements or the effect of the combination of micro and macro-




The hypothesis tested is whether ARs are earned or not in the period after trading statements 
releases but preceding earnings announcements. The hypothesis is as follows: 
▪ 𝐻0: (𝐶𝐴𝑅1+𝑇 ) = 0    
▪ 𝐻0: (𝐶𝐴𝑅1+𝑇 ) ≠ 0   
Table 9 below indicates that the CARs are not earned in the (𝐶𝐴𝑅1+5 ) window period after 
trading statements releases. The conclusion is that the initial market responses to unexpected 
earnings and the sign of news cannot be used to predict either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news portfolios 
and ARs over the (1, 5) post-release window. The results on CARs are consistent with semi-
strong form market efficiency (Cata, 2015). Also, no evidence of an association between the 
sign of CARs in the days’ variation of [1; 2) and [3; 5] and ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news portfolios post-
releases. 




Good News Portfolio Bad News Portfolio 
Mean CAR 
(%) t-stat P-Value (<0,05) 
Mean CAR 
(%) t-stat P-Value (<0,05) 
1 to 2 -0.00121 *1.12371 0.26172 -0.00248 0.72753 0.46774 
3 to 5 -0.00074 0.79715 0.42563 -0.00020 0.11805 0.90610 
 
6.4 THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF ACTUAL EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS  
 
The essence of this section is to assess the relationship between post releases and investor 
reaction to the earnings announcement. Since the release has passed, the investor's use of 
that information is part of other timelier sources of information that led to a revise their JSE 
security valuations. In section 6.4.2 will discuss the magnitude of the post-trading statement 
release drift and investor reaction to the actual earnings announcement. The presupposition 
is that the market reaction at the time of the earnings announced is negatively associated with 
the magnitude of the post-trading statement announcement. 
The key shortcomings of these event studies are the studys’ curious observation of the 
tendency to treat market events in isolation of each other when assessing their effects on the 
security price. This assertion is very true at a micro level, ie on a piece of company-specific 
market-sensitive information, well, after management pronouncements or analyst publications 
just before or after the study event. The more pointed example is figure 8 in Murie’s (2014) 
findings where no drift in the direction of the news is observed in the window period [2; +7] but 




This links us back to the 10 multi factor-model in the SA context as identified by Dr. Glen 
Holman (2018) which could possibly provide us with the explanatory power of which factors 
are at play on and around market news under the study investigation. A manager or investor 
who wishes to devise a strategy and around the news have to be well informed of what 
constituted the 85 to 90 percent pre-event market reaction as identified by Ball and Brown 
(1968) supported by the findings of Ball and Kothari (1994). The knowledge of this information 
should tell you how strong and the duration of the trend after news releases and how to factor 
the information and transaction costs to profit on the trade. 
The importance of this section is on the notion that upon the occurrence of a separate 
unexpected market event, such as releases, the market participants will wait for a specific 
known event to alleviate any concerns or clear any uncertainties. And, this is explained by or 
is the reason for the absence of statistically significant AR drift in the period after trading 
statement releases. The market reaction to earnings announcement and the drifts thereafter 
is compared and measured against the size of price movement in the post-trading statement 
release period. 
 
6.4.1 The Market reaction to and in anticipation of unexpected annual earnings  
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Table 10: The API spreadsheet calculations for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolio 
Good News Portfolio  
 




D Period  Sj equity return Market return Average AR API Good Formula 
12 5 P  -0.00879 -0.05364 0.04485 1.00467 (1+D12)* D11 
11 4   -0.05712 -0.02363 -0.03349 1.00428 (1+D11)* D10 
10 3   -0.20631 0.08246 -0.28877 1.00456 (1+D10* D9 
9 2   0.10501 0.11275 -0.00774 1.00698 (1+D9)* D8 
8 1   0.21146 0.03146 0.18000 1.00698 (1+D8)* D7 
7 0 0 0.83739 -0.01956 0.85695 1.00546 (1+D7)* D6 
6 -1   0.13032 0.18140 -0.05108 0.99877 (1+D6)* D5 
5 -2   0.34491 0.19207 0.15284 0.99920 (1+D5)* D4 
4 -3   -0.00389 0.07862 -0.08251 0.99794 (1+D4)* D3 
3 -4   -0.09037 0.21446 -0.30483 0.99866 (1+D3)* D2 
2 -5   0.10902 -0.03322 0.14224 1.00119 1+D2 
1   -k       1.00000 1.00000 
 
Bad News Portfolio 
 




D Period  Sj equity return Market return Average AR API Bad Formula 
12 5 P  0.34370 0.15429 0.18941 1.00386 (1+D12)* D11 
11 4   0.29574 0.07897 0.21676 0.99931 (1+D11)* D10 
10 3   0.08752 0.00986 0.07765 0.99441 (1+D10)* D9 
9 2   0.24245 0.04470 0.19775 0.99231 (1+D9)* D8 
8 1   -0.21341 -0.07127 -0.14214 0.98867 (1+D8)* D7 
7 0 0 -0.12856 0.11075 -0.23931 0.99129 (1+D7)* D6 
6 -1   -0.12952 0.04453 -0.17405 0.99665 (1+D6)* D5 
5 -2   0.09542 0.07886 0.01656 1.00055 (1+D5)* D4 
4 -3   -0.14552 0.13996 -0.28548 1.00041 (1+D4)* D3 
3 -4   0.23539 0.01828 0.21710 1.00628 (1+D3)* D2 
2 -5   0.19664 0.12312 0.07352 1.00150 1+D2 
1   
-
k       1.00000 1.00000 
 
About 6.3.1, the opposite is true for unexpected annual earnings in table 2 and figure 2 that 
suggests the market either anticipated or there was information leakage of private information 
on ‘bad’ news portfolio of sampled firms a day prior to release. For a ‘good’ news portfolio it 
appears the market signal substantially updates the market's information, therefore, ‘earnings 





6.4.2 The association between unexpected annual earnings and security returns 
 
This section analysis the security price behavior on and around earnings announcement and 
associated estimated AR during the time. The investor rationality, access and continuous 
consumption of other market news suggest a view that at least a portion of the study event 
information causing investors to revise their security valuations to an extent of 85 to 90 (Ball 
and Brown, 1968) and 85 to 98 (Kornik, 2005) percent of market information is impounded 
into the security prices pre-event date. The timeliness of this information event appears to 
relate to the extent or lack of the investor reaction to other timelier sources of information and 
or completely new information. 
In this section, the study determines any statistically significant ARs associated with 
unexpected annual earnings to provide the required evidence that the announcements contain 
new and sufficient materially information. The hypothesis tested is as follows: 
▪ 𝐻0: (𝐴𝑅0| earnings announcements) = 0 
▪ H1: (𝐴𝑅0| earnings announcements ≠ 0 
The computed daily ARs consist of four days variations representing window periods of, 
namely [-2, 0], [0, 2] and [-2, 2] and [+3, +5]. In testing for information content and to improve 
the informativeness of the analysis the average cross-sectional ARs were aggregated across 
the N announcements and were found not very significantly different from zero but not 𝐻0: 





















∴  𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟏𝟏𝟔𝟖 
Kornik (2005) and Cata (2014) found ARs of the total sample over the window periods not 




and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 0.61168. The statistically insignificant ARs on the release date provide evidence 
that unexpected annual earnings contain new and sufficient materially information only to the 
extent or lack of the investor reaction to other timelier sources of information. 





∴  𝒕𝑨𝑹 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟑𝟏𝟐𝟕 









The market reaction to unexpected annual earnings is slightly better than the trading statement 
releases in section 6.3.2.  The t-statistic value of the average cross-sectional abnormal returns 
is not statistically significant but not equal to zero, therefore, reject the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 
(AR0) = 0. The calculations are determined as follows: 
⎯
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 0.00362, (𝐴𝑅𝑡) = 0.03605 and 
√28 (number of sampled firms). 
 
Table 11: Average CARs around unexpected annual earnings release dates 
The average CARs and their t-statistics are for the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios over the 
event window period, classified according to the sign of the trading statement. The statistical 
significance is based on the 5% level (two-tailed) of significance. 
Earnings Announcement Model 
Obs. 
Good News Portfolio Bad News Portfolio 
Short Term 120 52 
Day 
Good News 












stat Event window 
-5 0.0012 0.0012 -0.1138 0.0015 0.0015 0.4706 [-5, 0]  
-4 -0.0025 -0.0014 0.7806 0.0044 0.0059 0.1144   
-3 *-0.0007 -0.0020 0.2827 -0.0058 0.0001 0.4651   
-2 0.0013 -0.0008 0.7508 *0.0003 0.0004 0.2914 [-2, 0]  
-1 0.0071 0.0064 0.6064 -0.0036 -0.0031 0.2901   
0 0.0071 **0.0135 -0.0257 -0.0049 *-0.0080 0.2785 [0, 0]  
1 0.0015 **0.0150 0.0871 -0.0029 **-0.0109 -0.2664   
2 *-0.0001 **0.0149 0.3995 0.0040 *-0.0069 0.1161 [0, 2]  
3 -0.0024 **0.0125 0.2905 0.0016 *-0.0053 0.0116   
4 *-0.0003 **0.0123 -0.0988 0.0044 *-0.0008 0.3077   
5 *0.0003 **0.0126 -0.1735 0.0039 *0.0030 0.3988 [0, 5]  
* Almost zero average ARs and **CARs are different from Zero 
Murie (2014) correctly pointed out that unexpected earnings models or measures are not an 
information source to the market, unlike trading statement releases. Upon close inspection of 
Cata’s (2015) table 6 a noticeable absence of asterisks sign representing a statistical 
significance at the 5% level (two-tailed) of the significance of ARs on trading statement news. 
Hence, Cata (2014) concludes that only the sign of ARs is positively related to the sign of the 
unexpected earnings measures or model on the earnings announcement date, albeit, a non-
information source to the market as explained by Murie (2014). Rather,  the ARs are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance based but are positive and negative, 




In figure 11, Kornik (2005) found a statistically significant correlation between unexpected 
annual earnings and ARs based on both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios over the window 
period of [-2; +2] of 4.03% and 1.03%, respectively. However, the outcomes were formed 
based on unexpected headline EPS using the analyst’s one-month EPS forecast as expected 
earnings as opposed to the two-factor model or any unexpected earnings measures.  
In table 13.2, the results show two-tail t-tests conducted to ascertain if the unexpected annual 
earnings had a significant association with the security returns for the [-5; +5] days variation 
period. Also, a one-tail test was used on post-earnings announcement based on [1; +2] and 
[3; +5] days variation to determine whether the mean ARs and CARs are significantly greater 
than or less than zero, respectively. Refer to table 13 (below), the mean CARs are significantly 
different from zero, positive for ‘good’ new and negative on bad news on both [1; +2] and  [3; 
+5] days variation post-earnings announcement disclosures. The t-test is not statistically 
significant, however, it is different from zero and this suggests that earnings announcements 
do indeed convey information to which security prices react in the direction of the news.   
The ARs for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios are not statistically significant at a 5% level of 
significance and approximately zero. As a result, in line with Cata’s (2014) finding the null 
hypothesis of zero ARs cannot be rejected based on both the sign of trading statements and 
the size of ARs.  
 
6.4.3 The relationship between post-trading statement drift and CARs in the period 
surrounding earnings announcements 
 
The study already ascertained that there are other timelier sources of information, earnings 
announcements are timely since investors revise their security valuations to an extent of 85 to 
90 (Ball and Brown, 1968) and 85 to 98 percent (Kornik, 2005) before this event news.  
Therefore, the expected security reaction post these events amount to a minimum of 2 to a 
maximum of 15 percent. Kornik (2005) observed drift on both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios 
of 4.03% and 1.03% over the window period of [-2; +2] on unexpected annual earnings and 
Murie (20014) of 1.24% and -0.22% over the window period of [+3; +60] on trading statements. 
The tested null hypothesis of no relationship is supported by the analysis of prior SA studies. 
Noting the timeframe elapses since the last trading statement releases to earnings 
announcement and the fact new information is introduced into the market all the time. Then, 




The study data show that out of 172 sampled firms 63%, 42%, and 9% published their earnings 
within 15, 10 and 5 days, respectively, after the trading statement release. A quick reminder 
that the study adopted short-term returns-based unexpected earnings measures (Foster et al., 
1984) of [-2; +2] with an event window period of [-5; +5] days variation to measure the market’s 
reaction to trading statement releases and earnings. The objective analysis dictates that no 
security price movement over the post-trading statement release does not influence any 
reaction towards the unexpected annual earnings, amongst other things, based on average 
the days between these events. 
In section 6.3.6 that there are certainly no observable predictable rational momentum effects 
on ARs after trading statement releases and also only 9% of earnings announcements were 
within 5 days from the release date. In section 6.3.4 the study concluded that the initial market 
responses to ‘earnings surprises’ cannot be used to predict the future sign of abnormal returns.  
Table 8 observed post-release statistical significant magnitude of firms’ security price reaction 
to unexpected earnings or ‘earnings surprises’ of 3.506, 3.533 and 1.789 percents in the [-2; 
+2], [1; +2] and [3; +5] days variation provide evidence that the new information is quickly 
impoundment into security prices such that it will have no impact on the earnings 
announcement. The security price drift d led to a view that at least in the short run the investors 
appear to have adjusted their expectations to the new information. 
In contrast to Cata (2014), the outcome suggests that investors isolate earnings events and 
that investors reassess their expectations and beliefs immediately to be ultimately reflected in 
security prices in the short run. 
The market reaction at the time of the earnings announcement is expected to be negatively 
associated with the magnitude of the post-trading statement announcement. The tested 
hypothesis is as follows: 
▪ 𝐻0: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and actual earnings announcement) = 0 
▪ H1: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| trading statements and actual earnings announcement) ≠ 0  
Table 12: The relationship between the post-trading statement drift and the CARs 
Days variation (-1; 0) Days (-1; 1) Days (0; 1) Days (-2; 2) Days (1; 2) Days (3; 5) Days 
Slope coefficient  0.0009 0.0006 0.0002 0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 
T-stat 1.366 0.994 0.281 **1.885 0.566 0.732 
P-value 0.1729 0.3208 0.7786 0.0598 0.5718 0.4643 





Table 12 result indicates the absence of statistically significant relationships between the post-
trading statement release drift and the CARs over the [-2, +2)] window period surrounding 
actual earnings announcements. The above table 10 provides the results for the test of 
association between the magnitude of the post-trading statements drift and CARs over the [-
2; +2] period surrounding earnings announcements. There is no relationship between the 
magnitude of the post-trading statement announcement drift and investor reaction to the actual 
earnings announcement. 
 
6.4.4 The association of the sign of unexpected earnings and abnormal   
 
The study has ascertained that the semi-strong form market efficiency doesn’t hold in the 
context of JSE, then, the expectations are that the sign of unexpected earnings cannot be 
used to predict the direction of CARs over this period. The assertion tested is the effect of the 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios on the security price direction.  
The tables below (table 13, 13.1 and 13.2) provide for exploratory analysis of the relationship 
between the sign of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios and CARs over the [1, +2] and [3; +5] 
window after the earnings announcement. The degree of association is measured with the use 
of chi-square, one and two tail t-statistic tests with varying outcomes. The hypothesis tested 
is as follows: 
▪ 𝐻0: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| unexpected annual earnings and CAR) = 0 - the sign of unexpected annual 
earnings  and the sign of CARs are independent; 
▪ H1: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| unexpected annual earnings and CAR) ≠ 0 - the sign of unexpected annual 
earnings  are associated with the sign of ARs 
Table 13 and 13.1 chi-square statistic calculations marked with * indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no association cannot be rejected at the 0.05% level of significance. However, 
when marked with ** provide evidence (in bold) of a statistically significant relationship 
between the sign of unexpected annual earnings classified according to trading statement 
releases and CARS. The results of a p-value of 1, as indicated with *, suggests that the results 
are not significant at p < .05. The results show no relationship between the sign of unexpected 
annual earnings and the average AR over the [1; +5] day variation post-earnings 
announcement period. Table 13.1 window periods of [1 to 2] and [3 to 5] for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 







Table 13: Provide for the chi-square statistics (Ball and Brown, 1968) summary 
Chi-Square Test Result (APA) - Average ARs 
Trading Days Observation X Squared Test P-Value 
5 172 18.58 *1.00000 
4 172 6.64 *1.00000 
3 172 74.12 *1.00000 
2 172 38.01 *1.00000 
1 172 16.44 *1.00000 
0 172 147.46 *0.87146 
-1 172 5.41 *1.00000 
-2 172 2.63 *1.00000 
-3 172 10.01 *1.00000 
-4 172 -20.16 **.00001 
-5 172 5.36 1.00000 
 
Table 13.1: Periods after unexpected annual earnings  
Chi-Square Test Result (APA) - Average ARs 
Trading Days News Observation 
 
P-Value (<0,05) 
1 to 2 Good 239 35.073 *1.00000 
1 to 2 Bad 97 19.385 *1.00000 
3 to 5 Good 359 96.349 *1.00000 
3 to 5 Bad 146 32.230 *1.00000 
*The P-Value is 1. The result is not significant at p < .05. 
**The P-Value is < .00001. The result is significant at p < .05. 
 
Table 13.2: T-tests of CARs [1; 2] and [3; 5] for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios based on the sign of trading 
statements 
T-test summary (1 to 2) 
‘Good’/ ‘bad’ news portfolio Good Bad 
CAR (1;2) 0.0007 0.0006 
Observations 239 97 
t-stat 0.858 0.039 
t Critical one-tail 1.651 1.661 
p-value < 0.05 = Reject 0.196 0.484 
t-stat 0.299 -0.063 
t Critical two-tail 1.965 1.972 
p-value < 0.05 = Reject 0.765 0.950 
 
T-test summary (3 to 5) 
‘Good’/ ‘bad’ news portfolio Good Bad 
CAR (3;5) -0.00032 0.00091 
Observations 359 146 
t-stat 0.2439 0.2337 
t Critical one-tail 1.6491 1.6554 
p-value < 0.05 = Reject 0.8074 0.4078 
t-stat 0.393 -0.040 
t Critical two-tail 1.963 1.968 





Tables 13.1 and 13.2 for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios are based on observation within the 
days’ variation of [1 to 2] and [3 to 5].  Table 13.2 results indicate that the null hypothesis of 
the unexpected earnings announcement is classified according to the sign of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
news portfolios and the sign of the CARs cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level. In line 
with section 6.3.4 under table 5.2 found no evidence of a relationship between the sign of 
news and CARs post-release period of [1 to 5].  This is in contrast to Kornik's (2005) and 
Cata’s (2015) table 8 findings that the signs of unexpected earnings can be used to predict 
the direction of CARs post-earnings announcement, therefore, which is at odds with semi-
strong form efficiency. This study under chi-squared and t-statistics tests found no association 
in line with the semi-strong form efficiency. Also, Kornik (2005) table 11 chi-squared and 
Murie's (2014) table 4 t-statistics tests found no association for [-3; +3] line with the semi-
strong form efficiency. 
 
6.4.5 The size/magnitude of firms’ unexpected annual earnings and the abnormal 
security returns  
 
The objective is to test the association between the magnitude of firms’ unexpected annual 
earnings and the extent of price movement post-earnings announcement. The study 
determines the magnitude of firms’ security price reaction to unexpected earnings 
announcement over [1; +5] days variation.  The evidence of significant association suggests 
that substantial investors reassess their beliefs/expectations solely based on the size of the 
unexpected annual earnings. It could potentially mean the size of the unexpected annual 
earnings compels the investors to evaluate and act in addition to and /or above other timelier 
sources of information, ie the larger the information content. 
 
The relationship is examined using the regression analysis (𝑦𝑖  =   + 𝑏𝑥𝑖  +  𝑖) to determine 
the relationship between the size of unexpected annual earning and magnitude of security 
price reaction as follows: 
𝑦𝑖  =   +  𝑏𝑥𝑖  +  𝑖 
The hypothesis tested is as follows:  
▪ 𝐻0: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| earnings announcement and CAR) = 0 - no relationship between the 





▪ H1: (𝑢1− 𝑢2| earnings announcement and CAR) ≠ 0 - the magnitude of firms’ 
unexpected annual earnings is positively associated with the magnitude of share 
returns. 
Table 14: The relationship between the magnitude of firms’ unexpected annual earnings and size of 
abnormal security returns 
Days variation (-1; 0) Days (-1; 1) Days (0; 1) Days (-2; 2) Days (1; 2) Days (3; 5) Days 
Slope coefficient  0.0009 0.0006 0.0002 0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 
T-stat 1.366 0.994 0.281 *1.885 0.566 0.732 
P-value 0.1729 0.3208 0.7786 *0.0598 0.5718 0.4643 
Observations 337 506 337 844 337 506 
 
The size of unexpected annual earnings for the selected sample of firms for the window period 
of [-2; +2] is fairly significantly positively related to the size of CARs. Even though the results 
are not convincing, the null hypothesis of no relationship between the magnitude of 
unexpected annual earnings and the size of CARs can be rejected at a 5 percent significance 
level on [-2; +2] days variation.  
However, the rest of the outcomes in table 14 on the other day variation post-earnings 
announcement are in line with the chi-squared test with a p-value of 1 on [1; +2], and [3; +5],   
in tables 13 and 13.1  (above). This suggests that the overall results are not significant at p < 
.05 post-earnings announcement period. Both, the p-values are not p < .05 and the slope 
coefficient is not significantly zero as indicated in tables 13, 13.1, 13.2 and 13. In contrast to 
Kornik (2005) for window periods of [-2; +2] and Murie (2014) of [-2; +1], and Cata (2015) 
these outcomes are in line with the semi-strong form efficiency. 
 
6.4.6 The post-earnings announcement drift 
 
The purpose is the ascertain any observable drift anomaly on the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news 
portfolios based on the sign of trading statements depicting both the sign and size. The 
hypothesis tested is whether the abnormal returns are earned or not in the period after 
earnings announcement within the [-5; +5] days variation. Based on Kornik’s (2005) assertion 
that new information should be impounded into the security price within a week of the 
announcement. Using chi-square Kornik (2005) found that JSE is consistent with the semi-
strong form efficiency because the new information is reflected in a security price within a 





The hypothesis test for any rational momentum effects of market reaction post-trading 
statement releases of abnormal returns within the [1; +5] days variation. The hypothesis is as 
follows: 
▪ 𝐻0: (𝐶𝐴𝑅1+𝑇 ) = 0 - abnormal returns are not earned in the (1, T) day period after 
trading statement releases. 
▪ 𝐻0: (𝐶𝐴𝑅1+𝑇 ) ≠ 0 - abnormal returns are earned in the (1, T) day period after trading 
statement releases. 




Good News Portfolio Bad News Portfolio 
AR (%) CAR t-stat P-Value (<0,05) AR (%) CAR t-stat P-Value (<0,05) 
1 to 2 0.00072 0.17226 0.29855 0.76541 0.00057 -0.11651 -0.06253 0.95021 
3 to 5 -0.00032 0.05561 0.39278 0.69460 0.00091 0.13327 -0.03998 0.96814 
 
Table 15 (above) indicates that CARs are not earned in the (𝐶𝐴𝑅1+5 ) day period after the 
earnings announcement. In tables 13 and 13.1 with a p-value of 1 indicating that the results 
are not significant at p < .05. Therefore, no relationship between the sign of unexpected 
earnings based on the sign trading statement and the CARs over the [1; +5] day variation 
post-earnings announcement. The results of table 15 indicate that the null hypothesis of the 
unexpected earnings classified according to the sign of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios cannot 
be rejected at the 5% significance level. The results are in line with Kornik (2005) in table 14 
of [1; +5] period and Cata (2015) in table 12  that found a lack of drift post-earnings 
announcement in security prices to be consistent with the JSE semi-strong form efficient. 
Figure 5: Trading days relative to earnings announcement date - CARs of 'good' and 'bad' news portfolios 
 
Figure 5 pre-earnings announcement investor reaction results on [-2; -1] days variation show 
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investors’ reaction two days preceding the trading statement release could suggest 
information leakage of material and non-public information (Kornik, 2005 and Cata, 2015). The 
security price drift is at a peak in [0; +1] period, thereafter, begin to descend showing a strong 
sign of semi-strong form market efficiency.  
Although in figure 5 and table 15 (above) the mean CARs are significantly different from zero, 
positive for ‘good’ new and negative on bad news on both [1; +2] and  [3; +5] days variation 
post-earnings announcement disclosures. But the t-statistic tests are not statistically 
significant at a 5% level of significance over this period casts doubt on the use of the initial 
response to consistently earn earnings above average normal returns. The results are 
consistent with Kornik’s (2005) table 11 and Cata’s (2015) table 10 findings of no statistically 
significant CARs, the investor cannot use the initial response to predict near-future ARs. 
 
7.5 Summary of findings 
 
The primary and secondary objective of the study was to ascertain the effects of unexpected 
earnings on security market prices of the JSE listed companies after cautionary and annual 
earnings announcements, respectively. This section summarises the results of the problem 
statement based on the tested hypothesis. 
 
A reaction to trading statement releases reveals the following: 
▪ At the news release date, the price generally moves is in line with the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
news portfolios based on the trading statement sign. The results on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
news are a return of 0.96483 and -0.58796 and CARs of 0.90716 and -0.47351, 
respectively. The results are consequently different from zero and significant on the 
release date. 
▪ The sample average 
⎯
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 0.00252 and a total of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 0.43365  are almost and 
significantly different from zero, respectively.   
▪ The statistical results are not significant at 𝑡𝐴𝑅 = 0.35464 and  𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 0.70290  for ARs 
and CARs, accordingly.  However, are significantly different from zero on the release 
date, hence, the null hypothesis 𝐻0: (AR0| trading statements) = 0 is rejected. 
▪ The results are against the rationale of a semi-strong form market efficiency where the 
ARs earned are expected to be approximately zero in and around the market news. 
▪ This may give an overall view that news is largely impounded into security prices well 




sources of information, releases and earnings announcements are timely since 
investors revise their security valuations to an extent of 85 to 90 (Ball and Brown, 1968) 
and 85 to 98 percentage (Kornik, 2005) before these events.    
▪ The study concluded that the initial market responses to ‘earnings surprises’ cannot 
be used to predict the future sign of abnormal returns. 
▪ The timeliness of information events appears to relate to the extent or lack of the 
investor reaction to other timelier sources of information and or completely new 
information.  
▪ There was never a contention on the continuous existence and of other timelier 
sources of information. It would have been absurd to think otherwise but rather the 
significance of trading statement news on the security price in the presence of 
continuous introduction of new information in the information ecosystem.  
▪ This outcome is in line with Kornik’s (2005) view that the investor reaction is a 
confirmation that the releases contain a degree of timely information. Therefore, the 
unexpected component of earnings causes a change in security prices although it 
resulted in statistically insignificant ARs. The reasons for insignificance are just 
explained below.  
▪ Since the researcher agrees with the impact of unexpected earnings on security prices, 
however, the extent of the effect is a product of accurate estimation of the parameters, 
the unexpected measures or moded used and the size of the investor reaction is 
measured by the price movement on the day of news.  
▪ The significant price movements on ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news portfolios appear to take place 
on intraday releases and the previous studies focused only on closing and opening 
price.  
It is noted elsewhere, that earnings announcements are secondary to the main objective of 
this study, ie trading statement releases. As discussed in section 6.4 the essence was to 
assess whether the market reaction at the time of the earnings announced is negatively 
associated with the magnitude of the post-trading statement announcement. The study has 
also noted challenges of timeframe elapses since the last trading statement releases to 
earnings announcement and the fact new information is continuously introduced into the 
market all the time. The hypothesis tested was based on the expectation of no relationship 
between post releases and investor reaction to the earnings announcement. 
A reaction to unexpected annual earnings reveals the following: 
▪ At the news announcement date, the price generally moves is in line with the ‘good’ 




and ‘bad’ news are a total return of 0.78290 and -0.09804 and CARs of 0.81176 and -
0.20009, respectively. The results are consequently different from zero and significant 
on the release date. 
▪ The sample average 
⎯
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 0.00362 and a total of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 0.61168  are almost and 
significantly different from zero, respectively.   
▪ The statistical results are not significant at 𝑡𝐴𝑅 = 0.53127 and  𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 1.11842  for ARs 
and CARs, accordingly.  However, are significantly different from zero on the release 
date, hence, the null hypothesis 𝐻0: (AR0| trading statements) = 0 is rejected. 
▪ The results are not statistically significant an indication of no relationships between the 
post-trading statement release drift and the CARs over the [-2, +2)] window period 
surrounding actual earnings announcements. Therefore no relationship between the 
magnitude of the post-trading statement announcement drift and investor reaction to 
the actual earnings announcement. 
The many points raised under reaction to trading statement releases are as much applicable 











CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
After Cata (2015), this is the second investigation of the entire price formation process 
resulting from the effects of unexpected cautionary and annual earnings announcements on 
security market prices of the JSE listed companies. However, Kornik (2005) and Murie (2014) 
have investigated, separately, the effects of the accounting earnings (herein referred to 
unexpected annual earnings) and cautionary announcement (herein referred to as unexpected 
earnings or ‘earnings surprise. ie Trading Statements releases) on the JSE security prices.   
All of these studies examined the (if any) violation of the presumed JSE semi-strong form 
market efficiency by assessing or observing any initial market reaction to the news, from this 
any observably predictable return drift, ie direction and magnitude, and lastly, whether the 
traders and /or fund managers can exploit such predictability through devising investments or 
trading strategies. This empirical research study employed a two-factor model (Van Rensburg, 
2002) to immediately measure whether the market sentiments of sizeable investors are fully 
reflected in the security price on the occurrence of the events of interests.  
 
In testing for the effects of the information content of the security prices, the average CARs 
and their t-statistic test were found to be significantly different from the theoretical or expected 
zero AR, albeit, not statistically different from zero. The mean CARs are significantly different 
from zero, positive for ‘good’ new and negative on bad news in and around news publications 
of [-2; +2], [-2; +0], [-2; +1], [0; +1], [0; +2] and a drift of  [1; +2] and  [3; +5] window periods. 
This evidence of significant association suggests substantial investors reassess their 
beliefs/expectations on the occurrence and the size of ‘earnings surprise and unexpected 
annual earnings. This finding violates the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) which assumes 
that security prices are instantly and fully reflective of all available information and that 
investors cannot use public information to consistently gain above-normal returns (Cata, 
2014). 
 
However, contrary to Murie’s (2014) figure 7 and Cata’s (2015) figure 1 the study found no 
suggestion that investors wait to determine the uncertainty regarding the specific reason for 
the change in earnings on the releases date to be alleviated via the announcement or 
publication of actual earnings announcements and therefore inconsistent with semi-strong 




relies on weak evidence of observed drift based on unexpected earnings measures or models 
rather than the trading statement news in periods surrounding trading statement releases. 
Secondly, Murie (2014) did not investigate the entire price formation process and his [3;+60] 
post-release would have included the effects of earnings announcements considering on 
average it trails by approximately 9 trading days from the releases. What we know is that 
based on this study observation and Kornik’s (2005) assertion that new information should be 
impounded into the security price within a week of the announcement. Thirdly, Murie (2014) 
correctly pointed out that unexpected earnings models or measures are not an information 
source to the market unlike trading statement releases and that an overlaps between the 
unexpected earnings models and CARs in the days before the release, cause false 
correlations and the results will have limited applicative use. Therefore, Cata (2014) would not 
have relied on the drift observed in unexpected earnings measures or models to reach such 
a conclusion. Lastly, this study already ascertained that there are other timelier sources of 
information, earnings announcements are timely since investors revise their security 
valuations to an extent of 85 to 90 (Ball and Brown, 1968) and 85 to 98 (Kornik, 2005) 
percentage points before these events. 
 
This study conclusion is that the t-statistic tests are not statistically significant at a 5% level of 
significance over the observation period, therefore, they cast doubt on the use of the initial 
response to consistently earn earnings above average normal returns. However, ARs and t-
statistic tests are different from zero and this suggests that releases and earnings 
announcements do indeed convey information to which security prices react in the direction 
of the news.   
 
7.2 VIEW TO FUND MANAGERS (Profitability by fund managers and traders) 
 
The central insight into the efficient market hypothesis is that that a variety of forces impound 
available information into stock prices fast enough that arbitrage opportunities cannot be 
exploited systematically or strategically (Langevoort, 1992). The results of the study comes 
from an observation of the following unexpected earnings models or measures of [-2; +2], [-1; 
+0], [-2; +1], [0; +1], [+0; +2] and a drift of  [1; +2] and  [3; +5] window periods.  The evidence 
gather is conclusive concerning the association of the information content generated through 
unexpected earnings disclosures and the average CARs and their t-statistic test found to be 
significantly different from the theoretical or expected zero. The outcome is statistically 




or trading strategies to exploit any potential gains from the price movement and even further 
no significant observed predictable returns. 
Langevoort’s (1992) view that earnings and dividends are inherently unpredictable resulting 
in an investor behavior of large guesswork and intuition an art partly explains the extent of 
investor reaction.  What is unpredictable is the combination of the occurrence and extent of 
the event of interest, probably releases confirm the extent (ie >20%) but not the when and 
concerning earnings announcement is vice versa. The study already ascertains that there are 
other timelier sources of information and since investors revise their security valuations to an 
extent of 85 to 90 (Ball and Brown, 1968) and 85 to 98 percent (Kornik, 2005) before these 
events. The timely part of the unexpected earnings stems from 15 to 10 (Ball and Brown, 1968 
and /or 15 to 2 percent (Kornik, 2005). This situation can be exacerbated by the information 
leakage (discussed below), presuming that the pre-events ‘normal’ market revision or 
valuation stems from other timelier sources of information. The intention here is not to examine 
the traits (ie natural biases – consume information differently and addictively – develop an 
instinctive reaction in the presence of certain self-indulging indicators/signs biases) of an 
average individual investor, however, you are forced to consider it because it is reflected in 
security prices and the most unreliable predictor (i.e the investor must have known and acted 
rationally in ‘purifying’ market consensus).  
The outcome of Foster et al. (1984) model 3 drift evidenced in table 4 suggest that an investor 
can devise a short trading strategy based on the 10 and 9 (i.e a buy) and 2 and 1 (i.e short 
sell) deciles over the five trading days in and around the release date. However, the intention 
of the study is not to ascertain the profitability of the events. 
 
7.3 FURTHER RESEARCH INTEREST 
 
7.3.1 A multi-factor vs two-factor APT model 
 
In accordance with the empirical evidence by (Van Rensburg, 2002) a two-factor APT is a 
better factor analytic procedure that gives a true return generating process for a ‘true’ single 
stock market portfolio, i.e. an appropriate market proxy. The empirical evidence suggests 
investors revise their security valuations to an extent of 85 to 90 (Ball and Brown, 1968) and 
85 to 98 (Kornik, 2005) before market events of interest provide for a compelling argument for 
an all-encompassing multi factor-model in the context of JSE. This study observed a security 
price movement in line with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios on [-3; -1] and [-1; -1] releases 




return reaction occurs in the two days prior to the announcement date. Kornik (2005) suggests 
that either a substantial information leakage or simply legitimate information dissemination 
(i.e. other timelier sources of information) allows for investors to correctly adjust their earnings 
prediction through company analysis and /or interviews with management prior to unexpected 
earnings announcements. In the context of JSE, an alternative argument on legitimate 
information dissemination and other timelier sources of information before unexpected event 
news provides for a compelling reason for a multi factor-model which includes a metal index, 
interest rate (ie 5 or 10 years repo rate), inflation rate, currency, beta, economy (ie GDP 
growth), stock size (small vs large cap), leverage, unemployment rate, values such as price 
to book value or price-earnings (P/E) ratios, momentum (market biases – a big thing). 
 
7.3.2 Market sentiments  
 
The market appears bullish during the recent coinciding study periods of Murie (2014) and 
Cata (2015) namely from 2010 to 2013 and 2010 January to July 2014, respectively. Although 
the market sentiments appeared more bullish in Cata’s (2015) and neutral in Murie’s (2014) 
according to data analysed based on the composition of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ new portfolio. 
Whereas this study period market sentiments appear more bearish towards considering the 
later years and noting that the top 10 constitute 65 percent as of 31 January 2019 (FTSE 
Russell Factsheet, 2019. Wasserman (2018) identifies the market to be a bearish market 
indicating almost 65% of shares are now 20% below their recent peaks, and technically in a 
bear market. Perhaps the next study should consider periods starting from 2010 since the 
introduction of compulsory cautionary earnings announcements to date. This will hopefully 
provide for a more robust and conclusive outcome in an attempt to validate the JSE semi-
strong form efficiency and whether investment and any observation and degree of information 
leakage and insider trading occurrence in JSE. 
 
7.3.3 Management forecast  
 
In this study,  there were 14 out of 172 voluntary releases (i.e <20% earnings change), albeit 
not large, and the number might improve in the future, therefore, warrant a separate analysis. 
The data analysis provides for a suspicious reason for the voluntary management forecast 
disclosures considering the total return of 0.05739, expected return of 0.01027 and CARs of 
0.04712 and only two bad news. The total actual return or price movement is 5.5 times more 




0.9 times more. Could it be investors' trust more voluntarily disclosures as opposed to 
compulsory disclosures because of a belief that these disclosures are ‘non-public information’ 
willingly made public by the firm, therefore, more credible and trustworthy?  Therefore, how 
reliable, relevant and accurate compulsory disclosures are? 
 
7.3.2 The comparative period  
 
JSE Limited Listings Requirements compel the issuer when satisfied that a reasonable degree 
of certainty exists that the financial results for the period to be reported upon next will differ by 
at least 20% except for those who publish quarterly results. A comparative period could be 
yearly or half-yearly or quarterly (voluntary), therefore, investors react differently based on the 
knowledge of the affected period.  This could be an explanatory factor to the observed size of 
security price movement and /or return drift (or lack therefore) of CARs due to other timelier 
sources of information (i.e half yearly and /or quarterly). The proximity of the comparative 
period to the study event could then have reduced the informativeness of the annual report. 
 
7.4 INSIDER TRADING 
 
The security price movement in the direction of the release news appears to have been driven 
at most by information leakage and at least through simple information anticipation. For a 
‘good’ news portfolio the evidence suggests that earnings change releases or information is 
well anticipated by the time of its arrival. The opposite is true for bad’ news portfolios, albeit, 
appear a random act, ie no logical explanation of why it did not follow the pattern of ‘good’ 
news. This random act extends to unexpected annual earnings results which are the exact 
opposite of trading statement releases. In general, for releases the security prices changes in 











































  Appendix A: Summary of Sample Trading Statement Events 
No. Date  Firm  Ticker  
Earnings 
Change  Trading Statement Period 
Release Type  (Increase 
  





Absa Group Limited/Barclays Africa 
Group  BGA  Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
2 10-Jul-14 
Absa Group Limited/Barclays Africa 
Group BGA  Half yearly Jun-14 Voluntary 
3 22-Jan-14 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
4 14-Jul-14 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Half Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
5 01-Dec-14 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Yearly Dec-14 Compulsory 
6 25-Jan-16 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
7 12-Jul-16 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Half Yearly - Update Jun-16 Compulsory 
8 06-Feb-17 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Yearly - Update Dec-16 Compulsory 
9 18-Jul-17 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Half Yearly - Update Jun-17 Compulsory 
10 06-Feb-18 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Yearly - Update Dec-17 Compulsory 
11 16-Jul-18 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Half Yearly - Update Jun-18 Compulsory 
12 05-Feb-19 Anglo American Platinum Ltd AMS  Yearly - Update Dec-18 Compulsory 
13 22-Jul-16 AngloGold Ashanti ANG  Half Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
14 02-Feb-17 AngloGold Ashanti ANG  Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
15 01-Aug-17 AngloGold Ashanti ANG  Half Yearly Jun-17 Compulsory 
16 31-Jan-18 AngloGold Ashanti ANG  Yearly Dec-17 Compulsory 
17 02-Aug-18 AngloGold Ashanti ANG  Half Yearly Jun-18 Compulsory 
18 04-Feb-19 AngloGold Ashanti ANG  Yearly Dec-18 Compulsory 
19 29-Aug-14 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN  Yearly Jun-14 Voluntary 
20 26-Feb-15 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN  Half Yearly Dec-14 Compulsory 
21 28-Aug-15 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN  Yearly Jun-15 Voluntary 
22 23-Feb-16 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN  Half Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
23 07-Sep-16 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN  Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
24 01-Mar-17 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN  Half Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
25 30-Aug-17 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN  Yearly Jun-17 Compulsory 
26 15-Feb-18 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN  Half Yearly Dec-17 Compulsory 
27 04-Mar-15 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Yearly Feb-15 Compulsory 
28 04-Sep-15 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Half Yearly Aug-15 Compulsory 
29 06-Sep-18 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Half Yearly Aug-18 Compulsory 
30 05-Mar-14 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Yearly Feb-14 Voluntary 
31 08-Feb-16 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Yearly Feb-16 Compulsory 
32 07-Sep-16 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Half Yearly Aug-16 Voluntary 
33 06-Mar-17 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Yearly Feb-17 Voluntary 




35 05-Mar-18 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Yearly Feb-18 Voluntary 
36 04-Mar-19 Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd CPI  Yearly Feb-19 Voluntary 
37 12-Feb-14 Discovery Ltd DSY  Half Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
38 27-Aug-14 Discovery Ltd DSY  Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
39 18-Feb-15 Discovery Ltd DSY  Half Yearly Dec-14 Compulsory 
40 10-Sep-15 Discovery Ltd DSY  Half Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
41 25-Feb-16 Discovery Ltd DSY  Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
42 25-Aug-16 Discovery Ltd DSY  Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
43 20-Feb-17 Discovery Ltd DSY  Half Yearly Dec-16 Voluntary 
44 31-Aug-17 Discovery Ltd DSY  Yearly Jun-17 Compulsory 
45 15-Feb-18 Discovery Ltd DSY  Half Yearly Dec-17 Compulsory 
46 23-Aug-18 Discovery Ltd DSY  Yearly Jun-18 Compulsory 
47 15-Feb-19 Discovery Ltd DSY  Half Yearly Dec-18 Voluntary 
48 25-Feb-14 First Rand Limited FSR  Half Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
49 02-Sep-14 First Rand Limited FSR  Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
50 22-Feb-19 First Rand Limited FSR  Half Yearly Dec-18 Compulsory 
51 19-Feb-14 Mondi Ltd MNP  Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
52 29-Jul-14 Mondi Ltd MNP  Half Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
53 10-Feb-15 Mondi Ltd MNP  Yearly Dec-14 Compulsory 
54 28-Jul-15 Mondi Ltd MNP  Half Yearly Jun-15 Compulsory 
55 16-Feb-16 Mondi Ltd MNP  Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
56 26-Jul-16 Mondi Ltd MNP  Half Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
57 15-Feb-19 Mondi Ltd MNP  Yearly Dec-18 Compulsory 
58 08-May-14 Mr Price Group  MRP  Yearly Mar-14 Compulsory 
59 23-Oct-14 Mr Price Group  MRP  Half Yearly Sep-14 Compulsory 
60 05-May-15 Mr Price Group  MRP  Yearly Mar-15 Compulsory 
61 13-Nov-15 Mr Price Group  MRP  Half Yearly Sep-15 Compulsory 
62 23-May-16 Mr Price Group  MRP  Yearly Apr-16 Compulsory 
63 07-Nov-17 Mr Price Group  MRP  Half Yearly Sep-16 Compulsory 
64 26-Apr-18 Mr Price Group  MRP  Yearly Mar-17 Compulsory 
65 20-Feb-14 MTN Group MTN  Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
66 19-Feb-15 MTN Group MTN  Yearly Dec-14 Compulsory 
67 28-Jul-15 MTN Group MTN  Half Yearly Jun-15 Compulsory 
68 18-Feb-16 MTN Group MTN  Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
69 04-Aug-16 MTN Group MTN  Half Yearly - Update Jun-16 Compulsory 
70 27-Feb-17 MTN Group MTN  Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
71 27-Jul-17 MTN Group MTN  Half Yearly - Update Jun-17 Compulsory 
72 02-Mar-18 MTN Group MTN  Yearly - Update Dec-17 Compulsory 
73 28-Feb-19 MTN Group MTN  Yearly - Update Dec-18 Compulsory 




75 17-Jun-15 Naspers NPN  Yearly Mar-15 Compulsory 
76 20-Nov-15 Naspers NPN  Half Yearly Sep-15 Compulsory 
77 15-Jun-16 Naspers NPN  Yearly Mar-16 Compulsory 
78 18-Nov-16 Naspers NPN  Half Yearly Sep-16 Compulsory 
79 14-Jun-17 Naspers NPN  Yearly Mar-17 Compulsory 
80 17-Nov-17 Naspers NPN  Half Yearly Sep-17 Compulsory 
81 13-Jun-18 Naspers NPN  Yearly Mar-18 Compulsory 
82 19-Nov-18 Naspers NPN  Half Yearly Sep-18 Compulsory 
83 26-Jul-18 Nedbank Group NBK  Half Yearly Jun-18 Compulsory 
84 09-Oct-14 PSG Group Limited PSG  Half Yearly Aug-14 Compulsory 
85 10-Apr-15 PSG Group Limited PSG  Yearly Feb-15 Compulsory 
86 08-Oct-15 PSG Group Limited PSG  Half Yearly Aug-15 Compulsory 
87 15-Apr-16 PSG Group Limited PSG  Yearly Feb-16 Compulsory 
88 12-Apr-17 PSG Group Limited PSG  Yearly Feb-17 Compulsory 
89 06-Oct-17 PSG Group Limited PSG  Half Yearly Aug-17 Compulsory 
90 12-Oct-18 PSG Group Limited PSG  Half Yearly Aug-18 Compulsory 
91 07-Mar-14 Remgro REM  Half Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
92 08-Sep-14 Remgro REM  Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
93 08-Sep-15 Remgro REM  Yearly Jun-15 Compulsory 
94 12-Sep-16 Remgro REM  Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
95 07-Mar-17 Remgro REM  Half Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
96 11-Sep-17 Remgro REM  Yearly Jun-17 Compulsory 
97 25-Feb-14 RMB Holdings  RMH  Half Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
98 02-Sep-14 RMB Holdings  RMH  Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
99 10-Sep-15 RMB Holdings  RMH  Yearly Jun-15 Compulsory 
100 26-Feb-19 RMB Holdings  RMH  Half Yearly Dec-18 Compulsory 
101 10-Feb-14 Sanlam SLM  Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
102 15-Aug-14 Sanlam SLM  Half Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
103 14-Feb-14 Sasol SOL  Half Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
104 11-Aug-14 Sasol SOL  Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
105 06-Feb-15 Sasol SOL  Half Yearly Dec-14 Compulsory 
106 07-Aug-15 Sasol SOL  Yearly Jun-15 Compulsory 
107 28-Jan-16 Sasol SOL  Half Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
108 06-Jun-16 Sasol SOL  Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
109 26-Jan-17 Sasol SOL  Half Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
110 25-Jul-17 Sasol SOL  Yearly Jun-17 Compulsory 
111 23-Jan-18 Sasol SOL  Half Yearly Dec-17 Compulsory 
112 20-Jul-18 Sasol SOL  Yearly Jun-18 Compulsory 
113 08-Feb-19 Sasol SOL  Half Yearly - Update Dec-18 Compulsory 
114 29-Jan-19 Shoprite SHP  Half Yearly Dec-18 Compulsory 
115 25-Feb-15 Standard Bank Group SBK  Yearly - Update Dec-14 Voluntary 
116 28-Jul-15 Standard Bank Group SBK  Half Yearly Jun-15 Compulsory 
117 24-Feb-16 Standard Bank Group SBK  Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
118 27-Oct-14 The Foschini Group Ltd 
FG-




119 09-May-16 The Foschini Group Ltd 
FG-
TFGP  Yearly Mar-16 Compulsory 
120 06-May-15 The Spar Group SPP  Half Yearly Mar-16 Compulsory 
121 07-Nov-16 The Spar Group SPP  Yearly Sep-16 Compulsory 
122 15-May-14 Tiger Brands TBS  Half Yearly Mar-14 Compulsory 
123 05-Nov-14 Tiger Brands TBS  Yearly Sep-14 Compulsory 
124 14-Apr-15 Tiger Brands TBS  Half Yearly Mar-15 Compulsory 
125 03-May-16 Tiger Brands TBS  Half Yearly Mar-16 Compulsory 
126 28-Oct-16 Tiger Brands TBS  Yearly Sep-16 Compulsory 
127 09-Nov-18 Tiger Brands TBS  Yearly Sep-18 Compulsory 
128 27-Jan-16 Truworths International  TRU  Half Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
129 14-Jan-16 Woolworths Holdings WHL  Half Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
130 14-Jul-16 Woolworths Holdings WHL  Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
131 12-Jan-17 Woolworths Holdings WHL  Half Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
132 13-Jul-17 Woolworths Holdings WHL  Yearly Jun-17 Compulsory 
133 17-May-18 Woolworths Holdings WHL  Yearly Jun-18 Compulsory 
134 19-Jul-18 Woolworths Holdings WHL  Yearly - Update Jun-18 Compulsory 
135 17-Jan-19 Woolworths Holdings WHL  Half Yearly - Update Dec-18 Compulsory 
136 17-Jan-14 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Yearly Dec-13 Compulsory 
137 11-Jul-14 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Half Yearly Jun-14 Compulsory 
138 23-Jan-15 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Yearly - Update Dec-14 Compulsory 
139 15-Jul-15 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Half Yearly - Update Jun-15 Compulsory 
140 02-Feb-16 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Yearly - Update Dec-15 Compulsory 
141 14-Jul-16 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Half Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
142 25-Jan-17 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Yearly - Update Dec-16 Compulsory 
143 14-Jul-17 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Half Yearly - Update Jun-17 Compulsory 
144 09-Feb-18 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Yearly Dec-17 Compulsory 
145 19-Jul-18 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Half Yearly - Update Jun-18 Compulsory 
146 24-Jan-19 Kumba Iron Ore KIO  Yearly Dec-18 Compulsory 
147 15-Aug-14 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Yearly - Update Jun-14 Compulsory 
148 16-Feb-15 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Half Yearly - Update Dec-14 Compulsory 
149 24-Aug-15 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Yearly Jun-15 Compulsory 
150 15-Feb-16 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Half Yearly Dec-15 Compulsory 
151 22-Aug-16 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
152 13-Feb-17 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Half Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
153 22-Aug-17 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Yearly Jun-17 Compulsory 
154 19-Feb-18 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Half Yearly Dec-17 Compulsory 
155 20-Aug-18 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Yearly Jun-18 Compulsory 
156 18-Feb-19 Impala Platinum Holdings IMP  Half Yearly - Update Dec-18 Compulsory 
157 09-Feb-15 Imperial Logistics Limited  IPL  Half Yearly Dec-14 Voluntary 
158 24-Jan-17 Imperial Logistics Limited  IPL  Half Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
159 07-Aug-17 Imperial Logistics Limited  IPL  Yearly Jun-17 Voluntary 
160 03-Aug-18 Imperial Logistics Limited  IPL  Yearly Jun-18 Compulsory 
161 05-Feb-19 Imperial Logistics Limited  IPL  Half Yearly Dec-18 Compulsory 
162 27-Feb-14 Exxaro Resources EXX  Yearly - Update Dec-13 Compulsory 






























164 20-Feb-15 Exxaro Resources EXX  Yearly Dec-14 Compulsory 
165 07-Aug-15 Exxaro Resources EXX  Half Yearly - Update Jun-15 Compulsory 
166 25-Feb-16 Exxaro Resources EXX  Yearly - Update Dec-15 Compulsory 
167 05-Aug-16 Exxaro Resources EXX  Half Yearly Jun-16 Compulsory 
168 02-Mar-17 Exxaro Resources EXX  Yearly Dec-16 Compulsory 
169 11-Aug-17 Exxaro Resources EXX  Half Yearly Jun-17 Compulsory 
170 06-Mar-18 Exxaro Resources EXX  Yearly - Update Dec-17 Compulsory 
171 08-Aug-18 Exxaro Resources EXX  Half Yearly Jun-18 Compulsory 




Appendix B: CARs of positive trading statement firms 
KIO – 2017/01/25        MRP – 2015/11/13 (Intra-day) 
  
KIO – 2016/01/23 (intra-day)        APN 2018/02/15 
 






Appendix C: CARs of negative trading statement firms 
KIO – 2016/02/02 (Intra-day)       TBS – 2015/04/15 (Intra-day) 
  
AMS – 2017/07/18 (Intra-day)                         KIO – 2019/01/24 
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